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Who has the superior right to a social network account? This is the
question in a growing number of disputes between employers and
workers over social network accounts. The problem has no clear legal
precedent. Although the disputes implicate rights under trademark,
copyright, and privacy law, these legal paradigms fail to address the
core issue. At base, disputes over social network accounts are disputes
over the right to access the people, sometimes numbering in the tens of
thousands, who follow an account. This Article evaluates the problem
from the perspective of the public interest in social network use, partic-
ularly the use that blurs professional and personal roles. The Article
argues that the public interest is best served by resolving these disputes
under a trade secret approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you work for a law firm, focusing on a discrete practice
area, say music law. One of your many non-billable responsibilities is to
contribute to an industry newsletter. However, the law is changing so rapidly
in your area that your articles are typically out of date the moment they are
published. One day, you decide that your time would be better spent opening
a Twitter account and simply tweeting the latest developments. In the casual
spirit of Twitter, you write tweets that not only inform, but also entertain
your clients and yourself. You make wry comments about judicial opinions
and the antics of the outsized personalities in the industry. You write a little
about your personal life, in part because you use the same account to keep in
touch with friends and family. Within a few months, several thousand people
in your industry have become followers of your Twitter stream. You and
your law firm are delighted. The firm even adds a link to your account on
the firm web page.
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A few years later, you leave your employer to go to a different firm. To
your surprise, a week after you leave, your old firm demands that you return
"their" Twitter account. What to do? Who "owns" the account?
This is, of course, not a problem unique to law firms. In many indus-
tries, workers maintain popular social network accounts followed by
thousands, even millions, of people. How do we figure out when the account
belongs to the employer and when it belongs to the worker? Who gets the
account when the parties part ways? This question has recently arisen in a
spate of cases. In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, a company that provides cell phone
reviews sued a reviewer for taking his Twitter account with him after he left
the job.' In Eagle v. Morgan, a former employee sued a financial service
company for changing the password on her LinkedIn account and transfer-
ring it to another employee the day she was fired.2 In Christou v. Beatport,
LLC, a night-club owner sued a former employee for using the password to
the plaintiffs MySpace pages to advertise his new club.3
The cases have aroused intense interest.4 Approximately one billion peo-
ple participate in online social networking. In addition, more than 70 per-
cent of companies maintain a social network presence, and the number is
rapidly increasing.6 Cumulatively, employers and individuals have enormous
investments in social network platforms at stake. The precedents set will
1. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011).
2. Eagle v. Morgan, No. I1-4303, 2011 WL 6739448 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011).
3. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Colo. 2012); see also
Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 WL 6101949 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 2011) (involving an employee suing an employer for accessing and posting messages
through her personal Twitter and Facebook accounts); Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, I I
CIV. 5013, 2011 WL 4965172 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011) (involving a plaintiff who claimed
that a former employee took social network accounts she had maintained as an employee when
she left plaintiffs employment); Complaint, TEKsystems, Inc. v. Hammemick, No. 10-cv-
00819 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2010), available at http://op.bna.com/pen.nsf/id/jmer-86fq5g/$File/
linkedin-hammernick.pdf (alleging that a former employee contacted former clients through
her Linkedin account in violation of her noncompete agreement).
4. See, e.g., John Biggs, A Dispute Over Who Owns a Twitter Account Goes to Court,
N.Y. Timos, Dec. 26, 2011, at Bl; Elise Bloom & John Barry, The Role of Social Media in
Workplace Disputes, CORP. COUNS., Mar. 20, 2012, at 22; Melissa Maleske, Companies Sue
Employees Over Linkedn, Twitter Accounts, INs]oiDCouNsmEL, Mar. 2012, at 19; Joe Palazzolo,
Before Dispute over Twitter Account, a Fight over LinkedIn, WAL Sr. J. BiLoG (Jan. 10, 2012,
12:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/01/10.
5. See infra note 19.
6. The Overlooked Side of Social Media, BusINESs WEEK (Sept. 11, 2009), http://
www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-09-ll/the-overlooked-side-of-social-mediabusiness
week-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice; Doug Gross, Employers, Workers
Navigate Pitfalls of Social Media, CNN (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/07/tech/
social-medialcompanies-social-medialindex.html ("In 2012, it is nearly impossible to imagine
any company engaging with the public without using Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn or other
social networks.").
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affect not only these investments but also the public interest in preserving
the immense benefits of social network use.
These disputes are likely the harbingers of many more to come for two
principal reasons. First, social network accounts can be quite valuable. A
social network account may provide the means to transmit a message to
thousands of people. In the PhoneDog case, for example, 17,000 people fol-
lowed the Twitter account at issue.7 However, a social network account pro-
vides much more than a means to make a one-way broadcast. A popular
account offers access to an engaged audience, a means to crowdsource ideas
and feedback, a self-reinforcing community of people connected by their
shared interests, and, finally, a way to reach into the network of each person
linked to the account.
Take Lady Gaga's Facebook page, for example. The pop star has fifty
million Facebook users linked to her account.8 She uses her Facebook page
to promote her music, products, and charities by sending messages which
appear automatically in the newsfeeds of her followers.9 Meanwhile, her fol-
lowers can both respond to Lady Gaga and communicate with each other by
posting on her page, giving Lady Gaga direct feedback and strengthening
her community of fans, the so-called "little monsters." 0 Moreover, each fan
may pass on Lady Gaga's comments and other postings to their friends. As a
result, Lady Gaga's messages are distributed to an even larger circle than the
fifty million Facebook users linked to her account." Unsurprisingly, not
only individuals, but a broad range of organizations, have created social net-
work accounts to take advantage of these opportunities.
Second, the blurring of personal and professional roles on social net-
work platforms leads to confusion over who has the superior rights to ac-
count. Because the account is in some ways a proxy for a person, people
tend to use one account on a given platform to represent themselves for all
purposes, including both personal and professional types of use. And be-
cause users participating in social network platforms expect interaction with
people, organizations have found that using real people to "converse" on
their behalf in a personal manner leads to success on social network plat-
forms. Therefore, the features that make social network platforms effective
as a means of communication lead to competing claims to an account. Indi-
viduals tend to blur personal and professional use at the same time that em-
7. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 ME1, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
8. Courteney Palis, Facebook's 15 Most Popular People: Celebrity Pages with the
Most Likes, TM HUFFINGTON Posr (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/
14/facebook-popular-people-pages-likesn1341726.html?view=print&comm ref=false.
9. Lady Gaga, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ladygaga (last visited Feb. 9,
2013).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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ployers ask their workersl2 to represent them in a personal manner. Where
there is no express agreement on the issue, the question of who has superior
rights to the account becomes blurry indeed.
This is a new area with no clear legal framework. The problem of legal
framing is this: a social network account can be shorn of all content that
gives rise to clear legal rights. The name of the account may be changed to
avoid a trademark claim. Copyrighted and private content can be deleted.
The account may be reduced to a node to which other people have linked
their accounts. No clear legal rights inhere in the links to the account, yet, by
providing automatic access to an audience, the links are what give the ac-
count value.
This Article argues that trade secret law provides the best legal frame-
work for resolving these disputes. The secret of access to the social network
account-the password-should be protectable as a trade secret.' 3 A pass-
word's secrecy confers independent economic value by giving the account
holder exclusive access to the links in the account.14 This trade secret protec-
tion, however, would be highly limited. It would protect only access to the
account, but not any content otherwise available to the public. Crucially, any
other user could still contact the account's followers through other accounts.
Although narrow, trade secret protection would protect the interest at the
heart of these disputes: the right to retain exclusive access to the account's
followers.
Similar trade secret claims have survived motions to dismiss in two
cases on the issue." This Article expands on the cursory reasoning in these
cases and argues that protecting the account's password as a trade secret best
balances the interests at stake in these disputes. The investment of time and
effort to build up links to a social network account appears to yield signifi-
cant social benefits in the form of improved dissemination of information,
economic efficiency, and labor mobility. The bluffing of professional and
personal roles while building up the links to accounts only appears to add to
these benefits.
Trade secret law preserves incentives to invest in the account while pro-
tecting access to the account from misappropriation. Further, the hired-to-
invent doctrine would allocate rights in social network accounts between
employers and workers at the moment of creation in a manner that not only
maximizes incentives to invest in social networking, but also preserves
12. This Article uses the term "worker," because the worker could be either an em-
ployee or an independent contractor.
13. As required for trade secret protection, the password to the account is generally
secret. See UNwP. TRAD SEcRETs ACr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985); infra Part Ill.A.
14. This is true to the extent that the people linked to the account are potential custom-
ers. See UNIP. TRADE SecMv1rs Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985); infra Part II.A.
15. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076 (D. Colo. 2012); PhoneDog
v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
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workers' incentives to invest in themselves.16 As a result, the trade secret
approach promotes the public interest in online social network use without
unduly hampering workers' rights. Moreover, this approach would, except in
a few rare cases, work in concert with the resolution of other legal interests
implicated in these disputes, such as privacy, copyright, and trademark
concerns.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes in detail why and in
what circumstances disputes over social network accounts arise. Part II ana-
lyzes the legal rights and interests at stake in disputes over social network
accounts. These disputes implicate legal rights under trademark, personality
rights, copyright, and privacy law. The Article argues, however, that the core
issue does not fall under any of these legal paradigms and instead implicates
the public interest in developing links to the social network account. Part III
shows that trade secret law not only provides a mechanism to assert a right
in the core value of the account but also provides the best framework to
resolve the interests at stake in disputes over social network accounts.
I. WHY DISPUTEs ARISE OVER RIGHTS TO SOCIAL NETWORK ACCOUNTS
Social networking sites are "web-based services that allow individuals
to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2)
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3)
view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within
the system.""7 Some of the most popular social network platforms now are
16. In trade secret law, the default rule is that, at the moment of creation, ownership of
the trade secret vests in the party that created the trade secret. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 885 (N.J. 1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPFTIfON § 42
cmt. e (1995). Under the hired-to-invent doctrine, however, ownership in the trade secret vests
in the employer at the moment of creation if the employer and worker had an implied-in-fact
agreement that the worker would develop the trade secret for the employer. Teets v. Chromal-
loy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPIrIION § 42 cmt. e (1995). These rules are discussed in more detail in Part 11.
17. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. CoMPUrR-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2007) [hereinafter SNS Defini-
tions], available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/voll3/issuel/boyd.ellison.htm. "Social network
site" is a subset of "social media." "Social media" refers roughly to the group of Internet-based
applications, such as social network platforms, content communities, collaborative projects,
and virtual worlds, that build on the foundations of "Web 2.0," or the more participatory and
collaborative internet platforms that developed after about 2004. See Andreas M. Kaplan &
Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social
Media, 53 Bus. HORIZONS 59, 60-62 (2010). These definitions tend to blur in the common
usage, however. Commentators often refer to "social network platforms" simply as "social
media." In addition, some commentators refer to these sites as "social networking sites." See,
e.g., KEffH N. HAMiFON EF AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. Lum PROJEcT, SOCIAL NF-IWORKING
SrnfS AND OUR LIvis (2011). This Article uses the term "social network platforms," however,
because the term "site" is constrictive given the change in the landscape of technology away
from solely websites. In addition, the main focus of these platforms is less networking than
making visible existing networks. See SNS Definitions, supra, at 213 ("While networking is
A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights
Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Myspace, and Twitter." Together,
these sites represent at least a billion users across the planet.19
Several structural features of social network platforms and conventions
surrounding their use are crucial to understanding why links to an account
can become valuable and the subject of disputes over access. First, a social
networking account containing a profile is typically perceived by other users
as a proxy for the individual or entity.2 0 Unlike the web page context, where
the connection is understood to be a link to a web page and not a person, in
the social networking context, a link to an account is understood as a link to
the account holder.2' The terminology itself is suggestive of this perception.
For example, a social network user might say: "I 'friended' Noah Kravitz on
Facebook." 22
Second, social networks both facilitate and make visible the connections
between people. Online social networking is a means of articulating a sense
of connection by linking visibly to the account representing an individual or
entity. 23 Indeed, the opportunity for users to link to each other's social net-
work accounts is a defining feature of social networking. A user linked to
another user's account typically receives all the messages posted by that
possible on these sites, it is not the primary practice on many of them, nor is it what differenti-
ates them from other forms of computer-mediated communication (CMC).").
18. See Top Sites, QuANrCAsr, http://www.quantcast.com/top-sites-I (last visited Feb.
19, 2013) (listing website rankings). The number of users on these sites are: Facebook 901
million; Twitter 555 million; Google+ 170 million; Linkedin 150 million; and Pinterest 11.7
million. User Activity Comparison of Popular Social Networking Sites [Infographic], GO-
Gutn (May 2, 2012), http://www.go-gulf.com/blog/social-networking-user.
19. This number is based on the monthly active users of Facebook alone, which
Facebook has reported as 950 million. FACEBOOK, INC., QUARITERLY RE-PORT (FORM 10-Q), at
20 (July 31, 2012). The number may be far higher given the number of users of other social
network services. Since it is difficult to know how many people use multiple social network
platforms, it is hard to add the numbers of users of each platform together to arrive at a total
number of users of these services. Based on a survey of thirty five countries, however, Insites
Consulting reached the conclusion that the number of social network users worldwide is
greater than one billion. Steven Van Belleghem, Insites Consulting, Social Media Around the
World 2011, at 31 (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.slideshare.net/stevenvanbelleghem/social-media
-around-the-world-201 1.
20. danah boyd, Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics,
and Implications, in A NvrwoRKFD SFuL: IDENTIFY, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ON SocIAL
NiTWORK Srires 39, 43 (Zizi Papacharissi ed., 2010) ("Profiles both represent the individual
and serve as the locus of interaction.").
21. danah boyd, Friends, Friendsters, and Top 8: Writing Community into Being on
Social Network Sites, II FIRsT MONDAY 12 (2006) ("Social network sites provide a new or-
ganizing mechanism for developing context. Instead of slicing interest first and people second,
the Friending process allows people to choose people first and interests second.").
22. Cici Stewart, I Do Not Understand How Facebook Can . . ., FACBOOK, http://
www.facebook.com/help/community/question/?id=10151067468783440 (last visited Feb. 24,
2013).
23. See SNS Definitions, supra note 17, at 211 ("What makes social network sites
unique is not that they allow individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they enable users to
articulate and make visible their social networks.").
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other user automatically.2 4 The term often attributed to a user linked to an-
other user's account is a "follower" because the user follows the other user's
account in the same way that a reader might follow a story in the news by
reading each update as it is published. 25 Every time the follower checks her
account, she sees the latest postings from the users she follows.
Links can be unidirectional or bidirectional. On Twitter, for example,
links are unidirectional.2 6 When one user links to another user's account, the
first user receives the second user's postings, but the second user must sepa-
rately link to the first user's account to receive the first user's postings. 27 In
contrast, links to a personal timeline on Facebook are bidirectional; the liked
users become each other's followers and both will receive each other's
posts. 28 Users who are not followers of a particular social network account
can still see the messages posted on that account's newsfeed if the newsfeed
is public, but they do not automatically receive the postings in their own
feeds. 29 In other words, a non-follower would have to go to the other ac-
count's site instead of receiving messages directly in his or her own account.
Linking between social network accounts is therefore different than
linking two web pages together with a URL hyperlink.3" When a social net-
work user links to another user by following her on the same social network
platform, she receives communications directly from that other user.3' She
tunes in, as it were, to the messages broadcasted from the account. Linking
therefore provides an exceptionally convenient way for an account holder to
24. See, e.g., FAQs About Following, TwIER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/
14019-faqs-about-following (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); What Is a Twitter Timeline?, Twrr-
rER, https:/support.twitter.com/articles/164083-what-is-a-twitter-timeline (last visited Nov. 1,
2012); What Is Following?, PINTEREST (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:19 AM), https://help.pinterest.com/
entries/22980502-What-is-following. The account holder, however, can often choose which
messages followers see. For example, on Facebook, the account holder can limit who can see a
particular posting by making her postings only available to individuals in defined groups. How
to Post and Share, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/333140160100643/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2012).
25. See, e.g., FAQs About Following, supra note 24; What Is Following?, supra note
24. Not all social network platforms use the term "follower," but this Article will use the term
for the sake of uniformity.
26. FAQs About Following, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Michael Wu, Google+ vs. Facebook vs. Twitter vs. . . . Part 1: The Strength Of
Bidirectional Connections, Limium (Aug. 8, 2011, 1:40 AM), http://Iithosphere.lithium.com/
t5/Science-of-Social-blog/Google-vs-Facebook-vs-Twitter-vs-Part-I -The-Strength-of/ba-p/297
70.
29. See, e.g., About Public and Protected Tweets, TwrrreIR, https://support.twitter.com/
groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/14016-about-public-and-
protected-tweets# (last visited Nov. 12, 2012); Who Can See Your Posts, GOOCE, http://
support.google.com/plus/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-1053543&topic=1257360&ctx=topic
(last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
30. When this Article uses the terms "link" or "linking," unless otherwise specified, the
links intended are those between social network accounts.
31. See FAQs About Following, supra note 24; What Is Following?, supra note 24.
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communicate with the people following the account, sometimes on a mas-
sive scale. For example, in PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the Twitter account at issue
had 17,000 followers.3 2 In such cases, the social network account becomes a
medium for mass communication, not only from the account to the follow-
ers, but also, due to the direct access that linking provides, from the follow-
ers to the account holder and between followers.
Finally, social network platforms are, as the name suggests, social."
People link to each other because of a social connection, typically a preexist-
ing personal connection. 34 Social network platforms provide virtual social
worlds in which each account functions as a proxy for an individual and the
links among people are represented electronically. 5
As succeeding sections explain, these characteristics create both oppor-
tunities and stumbling blocks for organizations as they attempt to follow the
public onto social network platforms. They offer direct, automatic, and inti-
mate contact with the public, but organizations struggle to communicate in a
system based on and designed for social interaction between individuals.
Consequently, employers use their workers to communicate for them in a
personal capacity. The resulting blurring of professional and personal roles
on social network platforms leads to confusion regarding who has rights to
the account.
A. Why Organizations Participate on Social Network Platforms
Social network platforms began as sites for individual use, but an in-
creasingly broad range of organizations see participation in them as a neces-
sity.3 6 Social network participation can repay organizations with free access
32. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
33. See id.
34. See HAMI-rON yr AL., supra note 17, at 27 ("A very small number of Facebook
friends are people that we might refer to as strangers."); SNS Definitions, supra note 17, at 211
("On many of the large SNSs, participants are not necessarily 'networking' or looking to meet
new people; instead, they are primarily communicating with people who are already a part of
their extended social network.").
35. See generally SNS Definitions, supra note 17.
36. See id. at 210 (describing social networking sites as services principally for individ-
uals); Doug Gross, Employers, Workers Navigate Pitfalls of Social Media, CNN (Feb. 7, 2012,
10:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/07/tech/social-media/companies-social-medialindex
.html ("In 2012, it is nearly impossible to imagine any company engaging with the public
without using Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn or other social networks."); The Overlooked Side of
Social Media, BUSINESSWIK (Sept. I1, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-
09-11/the-overlooked-side-of-social-mediabusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-
financial-advice ("More than 70% of companies are already using social media; many are
planning to increase their spending on social media across the coming years."). The organiza-
tions that participate in social media through social network accounts run the gamut. See, e.g.,
Carolyn Elefant, The "Power" of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices for Utilities
Engaging Social Media, 32 ENERGY L.J. I (2011) (utility companies); Irwin A. Kishner &
Brooke E. Crescenti, The Rise of Social Media: What Professional Teams and Clubs Should
209Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:201
to vast numbers of people, amplification of communication through network
effects, consumer feedback, access to niche markets, and enhanced brand
loyalty. As a result, organizations increasingly attempt to engage with the
public not only by advertising on social network platforms, but also by creat-
ing social network accounts and entering the conversation themselves. 37
Perhaps foremost, social network platforms provide a means to go
where the people are. In 2011, the Pew Research Center found that forty-
seven percent of adults use social network platforms and the bulk of those
users engage with them on a daily basis. 38 In addition, use of social network-
ing is rapidly increasing, almost doubling since 2008.39 As researchers at the
Pew Research Center's Internet and American Life Project observed, "The
pace with which new users have flocked to social networking sites has been
staggering." 40 A whole generation is becoming accustomed to obtaining in-
formation through social network platforms.4 1 Moreover, unlike advertising
to the public through television, radio, or even a web page or a search en-
gine, social network accounts are free. 42
Participating in online social networks not only provides organizations
with direct access to potential customers and audiences, it also allows them
to reach into the network of each person directly contacted. 43 By making
Consider, ENT. & SPOR'rs LAW., Winter 2010, at 24 (sports teams); Nuria Lloret Romero, ROL
Measuring the Social Media Return On Investment In a Library, 24 Bo rrom LINE: MANAGING
LmR. FINs. 145, 145-48 (2011) (libraries); Lee Rainie et al., Ask the Expert, PFw RESEARCH
CENTER (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.pewresearch.org/2011/09/22/ask-the-expert-2/ (political
campaigns).
37. Brian Honigman, 6 Benefits of Social Media for Business, LUNAMPTRICS (June 8,
2011), http://www.lunametrics.com/blog/2011/06/08/6-social-media-benefits-for-business
(describing several ways in which social network use is beneficial for companies); see also
Jefferson Graham, Businesses Turn to Facebook for Word-of-Mouth Advertising, USA TooAY
(Aug. 5, 2009, 11:33 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/2009-08-04-facebook-
advertising-businessesN.htm. This section tends to use the example of for-profit companies
for purposes of simplicity. However, non-profit organizations, such as universities, political
campaigns, or public interest groups, have similar interests in reaching the public.
38. HAMFFON ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.
39. Id.
40. MARY MADDEN & KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW INTERNIET & AM. Lum- PRoJECT, 65%
OF ONuNE ADULTs UsE SoCIAL NFTWORKING SrEs 2 (2011).
41. Robert McLuhan, Special Report: New Reality Demands a Response, MARKE TING,
Oct. 26, 2011, at 37.
42. Most social network platforms are free, with the exception of some additional ser-
vices like LinkedIn's "premium accounts." See Albrecht Enders et al., The Long Tail of Social
Networking: Revenue Models of Social Networking Sites, 26 EUR. MGM. J. 199 (2008); Find-
ing the Right People Just Got Easier, LINKEDIN http://www.linkedin.com/mnyfe/
subscriptionv2?displayProducts= (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). Of course, participating in social
media has costs in terms of time and energy, but the services are generally free.
43. Stephen Baker, Beware Social Media Snake Oil, BLOOMBERG BUSINE-SSWEEK (Dec.
2, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-12-02/beware-social-media-snake-oil
("As millions of people flock to these online services to chat, flirt, swap photos, and network,
companies have the chance to tune in to billions of digital conversations.").
210
A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights
each individual's interactions visible to his or her network, social network
platforms effectively make the individual an advertiser for the company with
which he or she interacts.44 One way in which the user advertises for the
company is through word-of-mouth marketing. 4 5 For example, when a
Facebook user "likes" the Facebook page of a company, this action is posted
as a news item to all of that particular user's Facebook friends. 46 Social
network platforms also help organizations leverage "brand ambassadors"-
those consumers who already advocate for the company to their networks. 41
Organizations can use social network platforms both to find these people and
to leverage their enthusiasm by giving them greater voice.48 The most ex-
treme example of the multiplier effect of social networking is "viral market-
ing."4 9 In "viral marketing," an advertisement or promotion may be
disseminated at an exponential rate as users pass the information on to mem-
bers of their networks, who pass it on to members of their networks, and so
on. 50
Social network platforms also make it possible to exploit niche markets
more effectively. Social networking tools make it easier for people to build
44. William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing,
2009 U. lu.. L. Rev. 1105, 1116. Professor McGeveran principally discusses how for-profit
employers engage in social media, but the same reasons would apply in the case of any organi-
zation that desires to communicate with the public. See id.
45. Id. at 1116-19. See generally Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implica-
tions for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPO-
RARY RiEsEARCH 404 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (discussing the
phenomenon of word of mouth generally in the online context).
46. What Does It Mean to Like a Page or Content off of Facebook?, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/help/131263873618748/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
47. See SHIv SINGH & STEPHANin DIAMoNo, SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING FOR DummIES
13-17 (2d ed. 2012); Todd Wasserman, How to: Turn Fans into Brand Ambassadors, MASH-
ABLu (July 13, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/07/13/fans-brand-ambassadors/.
48. See SINGH & DIAMOND, supra note 47, at 219-30; David G. Taylor et al., Friends,
Fans, and Followers: Do Ads Work On Social Networks? How Gender and Age Shape Recep-
tivity, 51 J. ADVERTISING Ros. 258, 258 (2011) ("Not content merely to draw fans to its
Facebook page, the Red Robin restaurant chain enlisted Facebook users as 'brand ambassa-
dors,' asking them to send pre-written recommendations to online friends. Some 1,500 cus-
tomers-each with an average of 150 friends-agreed to post recommendations, which the
company estimates resulted in approximately 225,000 positive advertising impressions.");
Wasserman, supra note 47.
49. See McGeveran, supra note 44, at 1113; Natalie Petouhoff, Calculating the ROI of
Social Media, ADVERTISING Ac- (June 24, 2011), http://adage.com/article/adagestat/calculat
ing-roi-social-media/228399/ (discussing the benefits to a company of taking advantage of
SuperUsers).
50. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH.
TiELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189, 243 (2006). For example, in the Miracle Whip "pick a side"
campaign, thousands passed along Miracle Whip's invitation to vote as to whether they liked
or hated the condiment through Facebook. Nigel Hollis, Miracle Whip, Marmite, and the
"Love It or Hate It" Brand, BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/
managing/content/mar201 I /ca2011031_248948.htm.
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networks based on very specific interests or demographics.5 ' Companies can
then tap into these networks to sell the goods and services that specifically
interest them. 2
Because social network platforms enable two-way communication, or-
ganizations also benefit from consumer responses in the form of input and
feedback on their products. 3 For example, companies can participate in
communities, which are already discussing their products, or make their own
social network presence through a Facebook page or Twitter feed-places
where consumers discuss products and provide feedback. 54 Soliciting con-
sumer feedback also gives companies a way to avoid bad press on social
networks. 5 By entering the conversation, companies use the viral power of
social network platforms in their favor by countering false information, pub-
licizing efforts to fix problems, and apologizing. 56
Finally, social network platforms facilitate engagement with customers
in a "virtuous digital cycle" which increases consumers' brand loyalty." In-
terested customers seek out brands online and then are rewarded with oppor-
tunities to engage with the brand, which strengthens their interest and loyalty
to the brand.58 By building a following (a group of linked followers) around
a social network account, an organization creates a community around its
51. SNS Definitions, supra note 17, at 214 ("Some sites are designed with specific eth-
nic, religious, sexual orientation, political, or other identity-driven categories in mind. . .. [I]t
is not uncommon to find groups using sites to segregate themselves by nationality, age, educa-
tional level, or other factors that typically segment society . . . .").
52. See CHRis ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUrURE OF BUSINESS Is SiELI.ING
LESS OF MORE 98-124 (2006) (describing how demand for niche products has increased dra-
matically due to the increase in online word of mouth marketing); Heather Whaling, Niche
Social Networks Deliver Big Results for Brands, MASHABLE (Nov. 27, 2011), http://mashable.
com/2011/11/27/niche-social-marketing/.
53. See JEFF HowE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD is DRIVING THE
FUTURE oF BUSINESS 112-13 (2008) (discussing how companies benefit from crowd-
sourcing).
54. For example, Frito-Lay solicits input on new potato chip flavors on Facebook. Ste-
phanie Clifford, Social Media Are Giving a Voice to Taste Buds, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/3 1/technology/facebook-twitter-and-foursquare-as-corporate
-focus-groups.html?_r-0; see also The Case for Social Media Feedback Management, A-E
GIANCE (2010), http://www.allegiance.com/documents/Case-forSocialMediaFeedback
Management.pdf.
55. See Tristan Morales, Social Media Campaigns as an Emerging Alternative to Liti-
gation, 38 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 35, 50-53 (2012) (discussing opportunities for
companies to address bad press in the blogosphere); Gabriel Beltrone, Brand #Fail, ADWEEK
(May 15, 2012, 6:40AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/brand-fail-
140368 (discussing examples of social media publicity fire storms and successful tactics to
counter them).
56. See Morales, supra note 55; Beltrone, supra note 55.
57. Louise Jack, Digital Consumers: Internet Turns Customers into Ambassadors, MAR-
KETING WK. (June 4, 2009), http://www.marketingweek.co.uklinternet-tums-customers-into-
ambassadors/3001054.article.
58. Id.
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brand. 9 For example, members of a community built around a digital cam-
era brand might share ideas for improving their photography skills.,,' The
connections that brand followers make with each other and the information
they share give them another reason to remain loyal to the brand.6'
As David Post observed in In Search of Jefferson's Moose, the value of
a network which enables multi-way communication grows hyper-geometri-
cally with the number of members of the network. 62 In a social network
account, the connections followers make with each other give the followers
more reason to belong. Thus, the more that followers link to the social net-
work account, the more valuable the social network account becomes, not
only to the social network account holder, but also to the followers.
B. Why Employers Use Workers in a Personal Capacity
on Social Networks
Many organizations, however, struggle to take advantage of the benefits
of social network platforms.63 Social networking campaigns often stumble
comically" or simply fail to draw any interest.65 The problem is that social
networks not only function differently than traditional forms of media, but
they also function differently than the so-called Web 1.0,66 the less collabo-
rative and participatory platforms of the early internet. Traditional forms of
media and even the nonsocial media internet operate primarily as one-way
forms of communication. 67 The company transmits a message via a website
59. See Eilene Zimmerman, Small Retailers Open up Storefronts on Facebook Pages,
N.Y. TIMiis, July 26, 2012, at B9.
60. Chris Brogan, Build Strong Online Communities Using Social Media, in SuccEss
SECRETS or TN SocIAL MEDIA MARKEFING SuPRsTARs 85, 87 (Mitch Meyerson ed., 2010).
61. See id.; SINGH & DIAMOND, supra note 47, at 91.
62. DAvID PosT, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MoosE 48 (2009).
63. See Beltrone, supra note 55.
64. For example, the social media agency for Entenmann's, a producer of baked goods,
joined the conversation under the #notguilty hashtag on Twitter with the tweet: "Who's
#notguilty about eating all the tasty treats they want?!" Jason Fell, Lessons from Entenmann's
'Insensitive' #NotGuilty Casey Anthony Tweet, ENTREPRENEUR (July 6, 2011), http://
www.entrepreneur.com/blog/219951. The tweet showed up in a stream of #notguilty tweets
relating to a murder trial verdict, drawing widespread criticism for insensitivity. Id.
65. Chris Brogan, supra note 60, at 90 ("Even if you build [an online community],
there's a chance that people won't come (and this happens a lot)."); Alexandra Reid, Custom-
ers Won't Come Just Because You're on Social Media, Bus. INSIanR (June 9, 2011), http://
articles.businessinsider.com/2011 -06-09/strategy/30063 170 1_social-media-startups-can-
customer-service.
66. "Web 1.0" refers roughly to early internet pre-2001, when the internet applications
were less participatory. See Kaplan & Haenlein, supra note 17, at 61; see also Mary Madden
& Susannah Fox, Riding the Waves of "Web 2.0": More than a Buzzword, but Still Not Easily
Defined, PE-w INTERNr 1, 2 (Oct. 6, 2006), http://pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/
2006/PIPWeb_2.0.pdf.pdf.
67. Mohit Kishore, Interactive Brands, HINDu Bus. LINE (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.
thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-brandline/articlel 678913.ece.
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or a television advertisement, and the public, or some subset of the public,
receives that message. 68 In contrast, online social networks function as a
two-way, and sometimes as a multi-way, form of communication. 69 Where
traditional media might be best characterized as a broadcast, social network-
ing might be best characterized as a conversation."'
This format poses a challenge for corporations and other organizational
entities. Organizations fail to engage the public on social network platforms
when they attempt to simply broadcast a one-way, impersonal message.'
For example, the online universe reacted with fury when Toyota indiscrimi-
nately sent reply tweets to users who were tweeting about the 2012 Super
Bowl.7 2 Toyota's tweets were sent from impersonal accounts like "@Camry-
Effect" and invited the Twitter users to enter a contest to win a 2012
Toyota." To contain the damage, Toyota's social media manager was forced
to publicly apologize.7 4
Both the architecture and norms on social network platforms encourage
conversations between people who have a personal connection with each
other. On most social network platforms, communication between parties
that have not voluntarily created an electronic link is limited by the site's
software.75 Even in social network platforms which allow broader communi-
cation, such as Twitter, users expect a conversation with people with whom
68. See id.
69. See Pierre R. Berthon et al., Marketing Meets Web 2.0, Social Media, and Creative
Consumers: Implications for International Marketing Strategy, 55 Bus. HORIZONs 261, 263
(2012) ("Web 2.0 technologies transform broadcast media monologues (one to many) into
social media dialogues (many to many)."); Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly,
I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW
MEDIA & Soc'Y 114, 128-30 (2011) (discussing the distinctions between a traditional broad-
cast audience and a networked audience where viewers are able to communicate with the
writer and other viewers).
70. See Peter Merholz, How to Extend Your Customer Experience Through Social Me-
dia, HARV. Bus. Riv. (Aug. 24, 2009, 10:23 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/merholz/2009/08/how-
to-extend-your-customer-ex.html ("It's a conversation, which means you both listen and take
part."); Poomima Mohandas, Firms Logging into Networking Sites to Connect with Customers,
MINT (Sept. 16, 2009, 8:59 PM), http://www.livemint.com/2009/09/16205917/Firms-logging-
into-networking.html?h=B ("Social media is not a one-way traffic"); Marwick & boyd, supra
note 69, at 128-130.
71. Mohandas, supra note 70 ("[One-way advertising campaigns] fail because social
network users are not looking for advertising and see through the sloganeering.").
72. Tonia Ries, Toyota Under Fire For #CamryEffect Twitter Spam Superbowl Promo-
tion, REALIME Rmr. (Feb. 6, 2012), http://therealtimereport.com/tag/automotive/.
73. Drew Olanoff, Toyota Takes to Spamming Twitter for Camry Super Bowl 'Promo-
tion', NExT WEB (Feb. 4, 2012), http://thenextweb.com/socialmedia/2012/02/04/toyota-takes-
to-spamming-twitter-for-camry-super-bowl-promotion/; Ries, supra note 72.
74. She posted: "We apologize to anyone in the Twitterverse who received an unwanted
@reply over the past few days. . . . We've certainly learned from this experience and have
suspended the accounts effective immediately to avoid any additional issues." Olanoff, supra
note 73.
75. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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they have some personal connection. The Twitter users' reaction in the
Toyota incident illustrates this expectation. Users complained because they
felt they had been "spammed."7 6 They expected a conversation, not an indis-
criminate broadcast.7 7
Because of this preference for a human connection, companies have
found that success with social network platforms often requires using real
people to engage with the public on the company's behalf.7 8 As one com-
mentator noted, "[T]here appears to be real and lasting value for employers
in having an online presence that feels human, not corporate, sanitized and
aloof."79 A constant refrain in the advice of marketers and public relations
professionals in this area is to replace the corporate voice with "real,"
"human," and "authentic" voices.80
Of course, companies are made up of real people and have always used
real people to communicate with the public. The difference in social
networking campaigns is that companies allow employees to interact with
the public in a personal, rather than purely professional, manner.8 As
PhoneDog, the company involved in a Twitter dispute with its former
worker, stated, "PhoneDog has always strived to provide a very personal
user experience by frequently communicating with its audience, and all of
76. Olanoff, supra note 73.
77. "Spam" is generally defined as "unsolicited commercial e-mail." BiLACK's LAW
DICnoNARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
78. James Walsh, Companies Look to Capitalize on Viral Voices, WORKFORCE. (May 27,
2011), http://www.workforce.com/article/20110527/NEWS02/305279995.
79. Doug Gross, Employers, Workers Navigate Pitfalls of Social Media, CNN (Feb.
7, 2012, 10:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/07/tech/social-media/companies-social-
medialindex.html.
80. For example, Rob Frappier, a community manager at online reputation and Internet
privacy company Reputation.com Inc., states: "If your employees want to contribute and they
want to share their voice, not only is it a way to add value to your brand because it humanizes
the company, but it also allows employees to feel really invested in your communications
strategy." Walsh, supra note 78. An article in Advertising Age advises: "As the lines between
professional and personal continue to blur, companies that create more access for employees to
tweet and add friends will bolster the bottom line." Kaplan Mobray, How to Turn High-Profile
Employees into Brand Ambassadors, ADvE.RTISING AGE (May 28, 2009), http://adage.com/
article/talentworks/tum-high-profile-employees-brand-ambassadors/136918/; see also SINGH
& DIAMOND, supra note 47, at 91-98.
81. See Michael Masri & Pedram Tabibi, Social Media at Work Raises Issues of Ac-
count Ownership, L. TEcH. Niws (Mar. 27, 2012), available at LEXIS 1202546958712. As
Masri and Tabibi eloquently explain, "The line between online work and personal life-and
the content each generates-is increasingly blurring. Employees spend time on social media
platforms at work while also promoting themselves and their companies via social media. As a
result, questions inevitably arise as to who exactly is building a brand, what the brand is, and
who owns any customers." Id.
215Spring 2013]1
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:201
our editors were and are encouraged to tweet personal aspects of their life to
the account."82
At the same time, personal use must necessarily involve some discretion
by the worker. PhoneDog's former worker Noah Kravitz not only tweeted
about mobile phone technology, but he also tweeted on whimsical and per-
sonal subjects, such as bathroom smells and unicorn paintings." The com-
pany must surrender some control to the individual worker to allow him to
express himself in this manner.
Not all organizations are willing to expose themselves to the risks of
discretionary social networking use. Employees may leak confidential infor-
mation,8 4 embarrass the company," or post offensive or private information
about co-workers.86 The fact that many employers continue to allow employ-
ees to blur personal and professional use of social network platforms, and
often even request that they do so, attests to the benefit this practice provides
them.
C. Blurred Personal and Professional Use and Blurred Personal
and Professional Roles
The blurring of professional and personal use on social network plat-
forms makes it unclear whose interests an account holder intends to serve.
The problem is not simply that the same account contains both personal and
professional information. To equate discussing professional matters, such as
cell phone features, with serving the employer and discussing personal mat-
ters, such as thoughts about unicorn paintings, with serving the worker over-
82. Shaylin Clark, Follow-Up: PhoneDog Discusses Twitter Lawsuit, WPAPRONEWS
(Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.webpronews.com/follow-up-phonedog-discusses-twitter-lawsuit-
2011-12.
83. Chris Taylor, Meet the Writer Being Sued for His 17,000 Twitter Followers, MASH-
ABLE (Dec. 30, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/12/30/twitter-follower-lawsuit-noah-kravitz/.
84. A 2010 study found that ninety-four percent of users of one large social network
accepted a "friend request" from a complete stranger, presented to them as being an attractive
young woman, and then revealed confidential business information to their new "friend."
Marie-Andrde Weiss, The Use of Social Media Sites Data by Business Organizations in Their
Relationship with Employees, J. INTERNur L., Aug. 2011, at 16, 19-20.
85. In one example, an employee of a company handling Chrysler's new media strate-
gies sent out a rogue tweet: "I find it ironic that Detroit is known as the #motorcity and yet no
one knows how to fucking drive." Carter Yang, Chrysler's "F'ing" Tweet No LOL Matter to
Detroit, CBS MONFY WATCH (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_162-
20041891-503983.html. In another example, followers of the Red Cross Twitter account were
surprised to see the following tweet: "Ryan found two more 4 bottle packs of Dogfish Head's
Midas Touch beer. . . . when we drink we do it right #gettngslizzerd," posted mistakenly by a
Red Cross employee. Dean Praetorius, The Red Cross' Rogue Tweet: #getingslizzerd on Dog-
fish Head's Midas Touch, HUFFINGTON Posr (Feb. 16, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/16/red-cross-rogue-tweet-n_824114.html.
86. Robert H. Bernstein, On the Horizon: Employer Liability for Employee Social Me-
dia Communications and Conduct, ASPATORE, Feb. 2011, at *3-5, available at 2011 WL
601170.
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simplifies the matter. The problem is also that the personal or professional
nature of the content does not clearly indicate which party the speaker is
serving. Personal commentary serves the employer by humanizing the com-
pany, while professional commentary serves the worker by boosting his rep-
utation and professional network.
Not surprisingly, given the concerns about online gaffes, the employees
that organizations allow to engage with the public on behalf of the company
tend to be those workers who already have significant experience and discre-
tion in dealing with the public. The blurring of personal and professional
social network use seems particularly common among three categories of
workers: journalists, high-ranking company officers, and salespeople. Thus
far, all of the suits filed involving disputes over rights to social network
accounts feature workers in one of these three categories.8 7 The cases reflect
widespread practices in these groups.
The use of social network platforms among journalists is particularly
ubiquitous. The development of the internet in the last decade has put tre-
mendous pressure on print media to adapt to the digital world or dramati-
cally lose readership." Many media organizations have responded to this
threat by using social network platforms to build readership, with significant
success. 9 For example, like many internet-based businesses, PhoneDog is
essentially a media company; it uses content to draw an audience and uses
the audience to sell advertising.9 "1 The content, in the form of cell phone
reviews, is primarily provided on its website. However, PhoneDog also uses
87. Journalist can be interpreted more broadly as media-worker or content provider.
Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (involving seller of
professional services); PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at * I
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (involving media worker who provided content for phone review
website); Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., 772 F.Supp.2d 967, 969 (N.D. 111.
2011) (involving Director of Marketing). A point of overlap is the media-worker who provides
content for websites or social media sites. Such workers could be considered senior officers in
the sense that they control marketing or public relations or could be considered journalists in
the sense that they provide content. Other cases involving disputes over rights to access ac-
counts involve similar categories. E.g., Complaint 128, Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F.
Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT) (involving media-worker who
helped develop social media pages).
88. Newspaper advertising revenues have dropped steadily since the popularization of
the internet. Annual Advertising Expenditures, NiWSPAPER Ass'N OF Am. (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.naa.org/Trends-and-Numbers/Advertising-Expenditures/Annual-AII-Categories.
aspx. Newspaper advertising revenue is now at its 1982 level in inflation-adjusted dollars. Hal
Varian, Newspaper Economics: Online and Offline, FiD. TRADE COMM'N (Mar. 13, 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/mar9/docs/varian.pdf.
89. By January 2011, a study showed that over eighty percent of newspapers had cre-
ated Facebook and Twitter accounts. Sounman Hong, Online News on Twitter: Newspapers'
Social Media Adoption and Their Online Readership, 24 INFo. EcON. & Poi. 69, 71 (2012).
Using social media appears to lead to significantly more page views. Id. at 73.
90. First Amended Complaint 9T 8-10, PhoneDog, LLC v. Kravitz, No. 3:11 -cv-03474-
MEJ, 2011 WL 6955632 (N.D. Cal Nov. 29, 2011).
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social network platforms to draw more readers and sell more advertising. 91
The following is a segment of a current PhoneDog product reviewer's Twit-
ter feed:
Aaron Baker, @PhoneDogAaron
I can't quite pinpoint what it is, but ICS appears to change the
gesture input on the ATT Galaxy S IL Have to re-learn how to
press screen
Aaron Baker, @PhoneDogAaron
RT @PhoneDog Samsung Galaxy Note sneaks onto new T-Mo-
bile store signage http://pdog.ws/Ma8cGv
Aaron Baker, @PhoneDogAaron
I just used "doodads" in a conversation. As in ". .it was one
of those doodads that sticks to the wall." Not sure how I feel
about this
Kim, @happdgirl
@PhoneDogAaron Agreed.
Aaron Baker, @PhoneDog Aaron
@happdgirl do you use the word as well? I'm glad to hear
this92
These tweets are, consecutively, (1) a short update on a cell phone prod-
uct, (2) a link back to an article on the PhoneDog website, (3) a personal
comment, (4) a follower's response, and (5) a reply to that follower. Baker's
use of Twitter attracts readers to the PhoneDog site in several ways. The link
back to an article draws readers directly to the website to find more informa-
tion. More circuitously, the short updates draw readers to the PhoneDog
website because the website has links to Twitter feeds providing these
updates.
Baker's sharing of personal information offers its own draw. Baker's
Twitter account becomes a proxy for him personally. As shown below, his
photograph and a short description at the top of the page suggest that the
account represents him individually. 93
Aaron Baker
91. Id. 11.
92. Aaron Baker, Twitter / PhoneDog Aaron, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
PhoneDog.Aaron (last visited July 6, 2012, 1:33 PM).
93. See Aaron Baker, Aaron Baker (PhoneDogAaron) on Twitter, https://twitter.com/
PhoneDogAaron (Aug. 3, 2013).
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The personal information he includes, such as his thoughts about "doo-
dads," makes his persona more real. As danah boyd and Alice Marwick'
observed in their study on personal and professional use on Twitter,
"[R]evealing personal information is seen as a marker of authenticity." 5 A
follower's ability to talk back to Baker, and to literally converse with him,
completes the experience of connecting with him on a personal level.
In a very real sense, followers develop relationships with Baker. They
hear from him on a daily, even hourly, basis, and may, at their discretion,
engage him in a conversation. As a result, they care more about what he has
to say. This is especially true where the account holder provides information,
such as a review, which reflects his own opinions. Naturally, when readers
feel a sense of personal connection with Baker-perhaps even identifying
with him-his opinions become more important to them. This in turn bene-
fits Baker's employer, PhoneDog, by attracting more people to the site,
thereby increasing PhoneDog's advertising revenue.
This type of social network use is widespread. Many major news organi-
zations, for example, employ writers who also provide content in a personal
and individualistic manner on social network platforms.96 The Boston Globe,
NPR, and CNN are a few prominent examples of media organizations in
which journalists attract readers to their employers through vast followings
on their social network accounts.97
Not quite as ubiquitous, but still common, is the mingling of personal
and professional roles on social network platforms by high-ranking employ-
ees at companies. 98 These high-ranking employees, such as executive of-
ficers, chief marketing officers, and directors of public relations, often
mingle promotion of the company with personal use on a social network
account. For example, the Senior Vice President of Public Affairs and Com-
munications for Coca-Cola, Sonya Soutus, uses a Twitter page in which she
94. In deference to Ms. boyd's preferred orthography, her name is not capitalized.
95. Marwick & boyd, supra note 69, at 127.
96. See, e.g., Twitter, Bos., http://www.boston.com/tools/twitter/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2013); NPR Social Media, NAr'L PuB. RADIO, http://www.npr.org/templates/community/ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2013); see also Marshall Kirkpatrick, CNN's Social Media Pioneer Gets
Fired: What Happens to Rick Sanchez on Twitter?, READWRrIm (Oct. 1, 2010), http://
www.readwriteweb.com/archives/cnnssocial-media-pioneer-gets-fired-what -happens.php.
97. NPR Social Media, supra note 96; Twitter, supra note 96; CNN, TwiriR, https://
twitter.com/cnn (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
98. Barbara Lippert, The Tweet Life of CMOs: Some Social Network Rights in a World
of Wrongs, MEDIA WK., Sept. 13, 2010, at 15; Maleske, supra note 4, at 19 ("Ninety percent of
chief marketing officers now participate in three or more social media activities."); see also
SINGH & DIAMOND, supra note 47, at 102-05.
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both promotes the company" and tweets about more personal subjects, such
as her family.10
Companies formally encourage this type of use. As Coca-Cola's Online
Social Media Principles states, "We recognize the vital importance of partic-
ipating in these online conversations . . . ."01 Indeed, these officers serve the
company by advertising the company's products, and often provide links
directly to products on retail websites. But, again, part of the advantage is
the individual touch. Even when the worker advertises a product, he may put
it in a personal context. The Chief Marketing Officer of L.L. Bean, for in-
stance, tweeted: "The woman sitting next to us at the airport is making ear-
rings. They look remarkably like Royal Coachman fishing flies." 02
Naturally, when consumers feel a personal connection with the company's
employee on a social network, they are more likely to buy what that em-
ployee recommends. 03 More broadly, the worker's use makes the whole
company seem relatable."0
Finally, salespeople have always used their personal connection with
customers to persuade those customers to buy their company's products. Use
of social network platforms is a natural extension of this practice. The al-
leged facts in Eagle v. Morgan are representative. 0 In that case, Dr. Eagle
worked for a financial services company called Edcomm, where she pro-
vided banking education services to clients in the financial services indus-
try.'" She used her account to "promote Edcomm's banking education
services; foster her reputation as a businesswoman; reconnect with family,
friends, and colleagues; and build social and professional relationships."""01
Such use is particularly prevalent in the market for professional services
where workers develop long-term relationships with clients.0
99. Sonya Soutus, Twitter/ SonyaSCocaCola: Check out the Neat Things. . ., TwrrrLR
(July 5, 2012, 12:14 PM), https://twitter.com/SonyaSCocaCola/status/220958770325504001.
100. Sonya Soutus, Twitter / SonyaSCocaCola: Love my Friends and Family, TwIrma
(July 6, 2012, 3:58 PM), https://twitter.com/SonyaSCocaCola/status/221377617666916353.
101. Online Social Media Principles, CocA-CoLA Co. (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.coca-
colacompany.com/stories/online-social-media-principles.
102. Lippert, supra note 98, at 15.
103. See SINGH & DIAMOND, supra note 47, at 96.
104. See Lippert, supra note 98, at 15 ("Done right, it's very humanizing, a way to be
authentic and a way for followers to engage and find common ground." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Noreen O'Leary, Employee Benefits: Workers as Brand Ambassadors, Al-
WEEK (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/employee-benefits
-workers-brand-ambassadors-101844?page=1 ("[S]taffers offer a kind of peer credibility as
corporate advocates.").
105. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2011 WL 6739448 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011).
106. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).
107. Eagle, 2011 WL 6739448, at *1.
108. See Ed Frauenheim, You Can't Take It With You . . . Or Can YOu?, WORKFORCE
MGMT., June 2011, at 32.
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Again, the personal connection made by the worker furthers the em-
ployer's interest in building and maintaining relationships with customers.
Indeed, the employer in the Eagle v. Morgan case urged employees to create
LinkedIn accounts."'*9 The accounts, however, also serve the worker's per-
sonal interests. Workers such as Eagle use social network platforms not only
to connect to customers, but also to build a personal network of relationships
among colleagues, mentors, friends, and family.' "o Even the links with cus-
tomers are not built solely on behalf of the employer. Although the employer
might view them as its own customers, they are perhaps primarily the
worker's customers. Certainly, in the absence of any agreement with the
employer to the contrary, the worker is free to take the customers with her
when she leaves the company."' In many circumstances, clients feel a
stronger loyalty to the worker than to the company because the worker is the
person with whom the client has direct contact."12
A social network account not only serves the worker's interest by facili-
tating contact with her network, but also helps the worker to build her repu-
tation and market herself to potential employers. Specifically, the social
network account helps the worker to develop her "personal brand"-the
combination of her online image, reputation, and network."' As Dan
Schawbel explains in Me 2.0, an individual's online image and network can
be a powerful marketing tool. 114 Through social network platforms, the indi-
vidual can demonstrate her expertise, create an appealing persona and de-
velop a network of supporters, advisers, and potential consumers."' The
online image she creates is far more than simply a marketing tool for show-
109. Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *1. .
110. Eagle, 2011 WL 6739448, at *1; see DAN SCHAWHEL, M 2.0: BuILD1 A POWERFUL
BRAND TO ACHIEVE CAREER SUCCESS 67-72 (2009).
Ill. See Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 278 N.E. 2d 636, 641 (N.Y. 1972) ("In the absence of
express agreement to that effect between the parties, or a demonstration that a customer list has
the several attributes of a trade secret, courts, without more, should not enjoin an ex-employee
from engaging in fair and open competition with his former employer."); REsIATEnM]Nr
(THIRD) oiF EMPi oymNwr § 8.05 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011); RESTATEM'N-r (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 396 (1958); see also Phillip J. Closious & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonser-
vitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Propo-
sal for Reform, 57 S. CAL . L. REv. 531, 534 (1983). However, a worker may be liable for trade
secret misappropriation if she uses her former employer's trade secrets about those customers.
See, e.g., Leo Silfen, 278 N.E. 2d at 641. For more discussion of trade secrets, see infra notes
263-271 and accompanying text.
112. See Terry A. O'Neill, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency
Debate, 25 CONN. L. Riy. 681, 703 (1993) ("If the employee has a direct relationship with,
and valuable knowledge about, the employer's customers, that is enough to make the em-
ployee better able than any other competitor to entice those customers away when he leaves.").
113. See, e.g., SCHAwIo, supra note 110; Lisa Barone, Get over Yourself & Build Your
Personal Brand, Bus. INSIDER (July 25, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-07-25/
strategy/30025616_1_brand-social-media-audience.
114. See SCHAWHEL, supra note 110.
115. Id. at 3.
221Spring 2013]
222 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:201
ing herself in a good light; it also shows in practical terms the skills she can
bring to an employer to build a following or to use her existing following on
the employer's behalf.
Baker's Twitter feed is a good example. The professional content shows
Baker's expertise and knowledge, while the personal content demonstrates
his personal charm and charisma. And the number of links to his account
attests to both his personal and professional abilities. Based on the 22,000
followers to Baker's account alone, many employers would undoubtedly be
interested in hiring him." 6 Given the current employment context where job
security and loyalty are rare, a "personal brand" such as Baker's is a valua-
ble and portable asset.1 7 It provides a way for a worker to take ownership of
her work and to protect her career."'
In all the above contexts, the social network account serves the interests
of both the employer and employee. Even the most personal post, such as a
link to a recent family photograph, serves the employer by humanizing the
company." 9 At the same time, establishing a reputation in the online com-
munity for expertise or attracting a following of potential clients and con-
sumers improves a worker's employment and earning prospects.
D. The Resulting Confusion Over Rights to Social Network Accounts
The mixing of personal and professional use in social network platforms
leads to ambiguity as to whether the employer or the worker has the right to
the account. This problem, however, does not arise to the same extent in the
web page context. Even if an employer gives workers significant discretion
as to how they communicate on the company web page, the employer clearly
has the right to the domain name because it is registered to the company.120
In contrast, in the context of social network platforms, the employer's
rights are less clear. The social network account exists on a third party plat-
form run by the provider, and, to the extent that workers open their own
separate accounts, all the accounts cannot be under the employer's name.
Indeed, social network providers often encourage users to open accounts
116. Twitter / PhoneDogAaron, TWIr-R, https://twitter.com/PhoneDogAaron (last
visited Aug. 3, 2012).
117. See Frauenheim, supra note 108, at 33.
118. See id.
119. See Soutus, supra note 100.
120. Where the employer registers the domain name in its name, it obtains a contractual
right to the domain name. See; e.g., Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999);
Zurakov v. Register.com, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 176, 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Network Solu-
tions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 87 (Va. 2000). But see Kremen v. Cohen, 337
F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the registrant holds a property right in the do-
main name). This contractual right includes the right to exclusively control the domain name.
Zurakov, 304 A.D.2d at 179.
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under their own names.121 As a result, the name under which the account is
opened does not necessarily indicate on whose behalf the account is opened
or operated.122 Thus, absent any express agreement on whether the worker's
use is personal or professional in nature, it is unclear from the account alone
what the parties intended regarding rights to the account.
E. The Heart of the Dispute: Links to Followers
At this point, one might reasonably ask: why does the account itself
matter? After all, the links are only virtual representations of real links be-
tween real people. The party which loses the account can always start a new
account and set up new links to the same people. For example, a consumer's
interest in reading reviews from PhoneDog about mobile phones does not
disappear or automatically transfer when a worker like Kravitz leaves
PhoneDog, taking the Twitter account with him.'23 The consumer can al-
ways return to PhoneDog's website or connect to other social network ac-
counts that PhoneDog operates. Links are also easy to change. Every one of
the 17,000 people following Kravitz's Twitter account can delink with the
click of a button at the moment Kravitz deletes the word "PhoneDog" from
his Twitter handle.124 If the followers choose not to do so, then the reason
may be that they follow Kravitz because they like him personally. In that
case, PhoneDog simply suffers the same problem as a company in any con-
text that loses a well-liked employee.
Nevertheless, the account has worth independent of the interests and
preferences of the real people they reflect, and this value heightens the po-
tential for dispute between employer and worker. First, the chief value of the
links between social network accounts is that they are automatic. Although
an internet user can always make a habit of checking a particular web page
for updates, the user receives communications from a social network plat-
121. For example, the Linkedln User Agreement states: "Don't undertake the follow-
ing: . . . Create a user profile for anyone other than a natural person; Use or attempt to use
another's account without authorization from the Company, or create a false identity on
Linkedln . . . ." Linkedln User Agreement, LINKEMIN (June 16, 2011), http://www.linkedin.
com/static?key=useragreement. Similarly, the Facebook Community Standards state: "On
Facebook people connect and share using their real identities." Facebook Community Stan-
dards, FACBBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/communitystandards (last visited Aug. 4, 2012).
122. For example, the Google Plus Terms of Service explicitly allow users to use its
services on behalf of a company. Google Terms of Service, Goocu;, http://www.google.com/
intl/en/policies/terms (last modified Mar. 1, 2012) ("If you are using our Services on behalf of
a business, that business accepts these terms."). But Google Plus cannot ascertain on whose
behalf a user has agreed to Google Plus's Terms of Service, simply from the fact that the user
goes on to use the services.
123. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
124. See How to Unfollow Users on Twitter, TwrrrR, https://support.twitter.com/
groups/3 I -twitter-basics/topics/1 08-finding-following-people/articles/ 1535 5-how-to-unfollow-
users-on-twitter# (last visited Aug. 4, 2012).
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form to which she is linked automatically and immediately.'25 To use an
analogy to an older medium of communication, the follower has preset her
radio to that station. Unlike a radio station, however, a social network plat-
form is a two-way form of communication in which followers interact not
only with the account holder but also with other followers.126
Second, the links in an account are sticky. People do not immediately
delink from an account when the name changes.127 They may not notice the
name change, may fail to understand what the name change means, or may
simply view delinking as a low priority.128 The account holder has a window
of time to reengage and secure this captive audience. Meanwhile, the party
which lost the social network account must invest time and effort to build an
account of comparable worth. Setting up a new account is trivial; the chal-
lenge is to persuade users to follow the new account.129 All of the major
current social network platforms provide users with the choice as to whether
to follow an account;I 0 they cannot be compelled to do so.131 And it takes
considerable investment of time and effort to attract followers. 3 2 Even if the
account holder is merely recreating links which he already had in a previous
account, the process is laborious. The account holder must effectively fight
against the same inertia which makes the links sticky.'33 In short, such iner-
125. See supra Part 1. A close parallel to the links to a social account is a list of email
addresses or snail mail addresses because these are also links that make it possible to automati-
cally receive communications.
126. See supra Part I.
127. See Lauren Indvik, How to Change Your Twitter Handle, MASHABLE. (Nov. 27,
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/11/27/change-twitter-handle/.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Jason Spooner, How to Instantly Lose All Your Twitter Followers, TINDOG
COFFEEHOUSE (Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.tindog.com/2010/01/18/how-to-instantly-lose-all-
your-twitter-followers/.
130. Accepting Or Declining Invitations: What Are My Options When Responding to
Invitations to Connect, LINKEDIN, http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a id/1303 (last
updated Mar. 7, 2011); FAQs About Following, LINKEDIN, https://support.twitter.com/groups/
31-twitter-basics/topics/108-finding-following-people/articles/14019-faqs-about-following#
(last visited Feb. 19, 2013) ("There is no way to ask other users to follow you on Twitter.");
How Do I Add a Friend?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/146466588759199 (last
visited Feb. 19, 2013) ("Once they confirm that they actually are friends with you, they will
show up on your list of Facebook friends."); What Is Following?, supra note 24; What to Do if
Someone Wants to Connect with You on Google+, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/plus/
bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer- 1294841 &topic= I 257347&ctx=topic (last visited Feb. 19,
2013) ("If someone adds you to a circle, that person isn't automatically added to one of
yours.").
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Thomas McNish, How to Build a Following On Facebook, Hous. CHRON.
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://smallbusiness.chron.com/build-following-facebook-32249.html; Ching
Ya, 10 Ways to Grow Your Facebook Page Following, SOCIAL MEDIA EXAMINER (July 22,
2010), http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/10-ways-to-grow-your-facebook-page-follow
ing/.
133. See, e.g., Spooner, supra note 129.
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tia favors the party controlling the account. Once followers are connected to
an account, they must consciously opt out to delink, even if the account
changes hands. Conversely, followers must opt in to follow a new account.
Finally, parties generally cannot share an account after they part ways.
In theory, a social network account could be shared, but this is not a solution
seen in practice for several reasons. First, one party can always lock out the
other by changing the password. Second, one account generally represents
one person. As danah boyd and Nicole Ellison observed, "[S]ocial network
sites are structured as personal (or 'egocentric') networks, with the individ-
ual at the center of their own community." 34 The intrusion of companies
into this world does not change the convention. An account is a proxy for
one person, whether that person is a company or an individual.'" Thus, other
users expect the account holder to use the same account for different uses,
such as personal and professional roles, but not to share the account with
others;' 6 they expect the account to represent one source. 3 7 Third, the terms
of use on many social network platforms reiterate this convention by prohib-
iting sharing.'3 " These prohibitions on sharing generally do not prohibit one
party operating an account on behalf of the other party as an agent, but they
do bar sharing between two entities.'39 Fourth, the account would have less
value to each party if shared, because the other party would reduce its con-
trol over the account and dilute the first party's voice. Sharing would dimin-
ish the sense of personal connection social network users would feel toward
the account.
In sum, the core of these disputes lies in competing claims of exclusive
access to a social network account.
134. SNS Definitions, supra note 17, at 210.
135. Id. at 211.
136. Marwick & boyd, supra note 69, at 114.
137. See SNS Definitions, supra note 17, at 9.
138. See, e.g., Linkedin User Agreement, LINKEDIN § 2.4, http://www.linkedin.com/
static?key=user agreement&trk=hbft userag (last revised June 16, 2011) ("You agree to: (1)
Keep your password secure and confidential; (2) not permit others to use your account; (3)
refrain from using other Users' accounts .... ); Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsi-
bilities, FACEBOOK § 4.8 (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms ("You will not
share your password, (or in the case of developers, your secret key), let anyone else access
your account .... ); Twitter Terms of Service, TwIr,'R § 3 (June 25, 2012), https://twitter.
com/tos ("You are responsible for safeguarding the password that you use to access the Ser-
vices and for any activities or actions under your password."). Of course, the parties could
simply ignore the terms of use and take their chances on the likelihood that the social network
site provider disables the account for violating the terms of use.
139. An agent has the power to enter into a contract on behalf of the principal. REs-1AI
MENT (THIRD) oin AGENCY § 6.01 (2006).
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F. Failing to Contract
In many cases, parties could avoid disputes by expressly agreeing about
which party has the right to control the social network account.140 Neverthe-
less, the default rules remain important because some parties will inevitably
fail to contract around them. Many companies have no employment agree-
ments for their employees at all,141 and those that do may fail to address
rights to social network accounts.142 Employment agreements are particu-
larly prone to omitting important issues because employees' roles tend to
change over time.143 For example, the social media director's employment
agreement may be the same one she signed when she was hired years before
as an administrative assistant, or even before a new social network platform
existed. In addition, given the rapid change in the world of social network
platforms, employers are unlikely to revise employment agreements as nec-
essary to keep pace with the development of new and different social net-
work platforms."'4 Moreover, courts will likely adhere to the general
principle of contract interpretation that contracts should be interpreted con-
servatively against the drafterl45 and will protect workers on policy
grounds.14 6 Such an interpretation would not extend general or vague provi-
sions that cover preexisting social network platforms to new platforms. For
these reasons, even though more employment agreements will likely address
rights in social network accounts as the issue gains more attention, the par-
ties will still fail to contract around disputes in a significant number of cases.
140. As Part Ill will discuss in more detail, an agreement between the parties is generally
the optimal solution for allocating rights in social network accounts.
141. For example, even many CEOs at publicly traded companies, a class of employee
particularly likely to operate under a written contract, do not have employment agreements.
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Con-
tracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain for?, 63 WASH. & Li, L. Rtw. 231, 241 (2006).
142. A 2011 survey found that only twenty-two percent of organizations have social
media policies of any kind in place. Maleske, supra note 4; see also Frauenheim, supra note
108 ("[Clompanies generally are not focusing on potential legal issues raised by employees'
use of social media for business purposes .... .").
143. Rachel Amow-Richman, Foreword: The Role of Contract in the Modern Employ-
ment Relationship, 10 Tiix. WESLEYAN L. Riy. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that employees' job de-
scriptions are not fully described in their contract, that roles and duties change, and that
obligations are often unclear when a dispute arises).
144. Consider the growth of Facebook, for example. Within two years of its founding,
Facebook could boast 14.8 million unique visitors in one month. Verne Kopytoff, Yahoo May
Pay $1 Billion for Site: Offer for Facebook Being Considered, According to Report, S.F.
CHRON. (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Yahoo-may-pay-I -billion-
for-site-Offer-for-2469263.php. A social media site may progress from nonexistent to ubiqui-
tous in a short time. See id.
145. RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 206 (1981). The employer is usually the
drafter of employment agreements.
146. This will be particularly true where the court views the agreement as a noncompete
agreement. See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARiz. L. Ri-v. 939,
943 (2012). To the extent these agreements prohibit a former worker from contacting people
through a social network, they may be viewed as noncompete agreements.
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Thus, the recent spate of cases involving disputes over rights to social
network accounts is likely a harbinger of many disputes to come. As public
participation in social network platforms increases, companies will grow
their participation as well, if only to be where their target market is located.
To improve their chances of success in this realm, they will ask their em-
ployees to participate in social network platforms in a personal manner.
However, without express agreements in place, disputes over rights to an
account are inevitable.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Disputes over social network accounts implicate rights arising under a
number of different legal paradigms: trademark, personality rights, copy-
right, privacy rights, and trade secrets. However, besides trade secrets, none
of the other legal paradigms effectively resolves the issue of which party
should have access to the account.147 This Part therefore concludes by con-
sidering the problem from the perspective of the public interest to determine
what approaches would best serve society at large.
A. Association: Trademark and Personality Rights
To the extent that disputes over social network accounts are disputes
over the source of content in a social network account, they implicate trade-
mark law and personality rights. Both areas are concerned with protecting
designations of source. Trademark law protects trademarks from use that
confuses the public about the source of a good or service.148 Personality
rights protect an individual's right to be the source of control over the use of
her identity, at least to the extent that such use would cause dignitary or
commercial harm. Personality rights may be divided roughly into two types
of claims.149 First, claims based on misappropriation of identity protect a
dignitary interest in control over the use of identity.'5 0 Second, right of pub-
147. With the exception of a novel trade secret approach, which is discussed in Part Ill.
148. Infringement of a trademark occurs when the defendant uses the plaintiffs trade-
mark in commerce in connection with goods or services in a way that is likely to cause confu-
sion among consumers. 15 U.S.C. § I125(a) (2011); Id. § 1 I 14(l)(a); see also, e.g.,
Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 314 (4th Cir. 2005). Infringement under state law is
substantially the same as infringement under the Lanham Act. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADE-
MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1.50 (4th ed. 2012).
149. McGeveran, supra note 44, at 1149.
150. The Restatement of Torts frames the tort as: "One who appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy." RESTAITMENT (SiecoNo) oi, Towrs § 652C (1977). Although some states limit liabil-
ity for this tort to commercial torts, generally courts reserve misappropriation of identity
claims for dignitary harms. I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THiE RIGHTS OF PuBInCITY AND PRIVACY
§ 5:63 (2d ed. 2009); see, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1446-47
(I lth Cir. 1998); Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 867 F. Supp. 175,
188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The privacy-based action is designed for individuals who have not
placed themselves in the public eye. It shields such people from the embarrassment of having
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licity claims protect the commercial value of identity.'' In addition, trade-
mark law protects an individual's identity by creating liability for the use of
a name or other symbol that would falsely suggest the individual's
endorsement.152
Trademark law and the right of publicity protect designations of source
in part to protect the rights holder's investment in developing goodwill in a
brand or person.'5 3 In the context of social network platforms, the links to a
social network account are effectively hardwired goodwill. The links re-
present people who feel a connection to the source of content behind the
account. 5 4 As a result, trademark law and personality rights would seem to
be a natural fit for resolving disputes over who has the right to control the
account and profit from the goodwill associated with the account's links.
This has certainly been the case in disputes over rights to websites.'"1 But
neither trademark law nor personality rights resolve the core issue of the
right to access the links in a social network account for the simple reason
their faces plastered on billboards and cereal boxes without their permission. The interests
protected are dignity and peace of mind, and damages are measured in terms of emotional
distress.").
151. Liability for violating the right of publicity requires the unauthorized use of some
aspect of the plaintiffs identity or persona that is likely to cause damage to the commercial
value of that persona. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 148, at § 28:7; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMIrroN § 46 (1995). Under either statute or common law, the right of publicity
is recognized in thirty-one states. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 150, at § 6:3.
152. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003); Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) ("In truth, a
trade-mark . . . is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good will
in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a commercial signature-upon the mer-
chandise or on the package in which it is sold."); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 774 (1992) ("Protection of ... trademarks, serves the Act's purpose to 'secure to the
owner of the mark the goodwill of his business . . . .'); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMTrIrrION § 46 cmt. c (1995) ("With its emphasis on commercial interests, the right of
publicity also secures for plaintiffs the commercial value of their fame and prevents the unjust
enrichment of others seeking to appropriate that value for themselves."). The misappropriation
of identity tort is more concerned with dignitary concerns than incentives to create goodwill in
the public. See supra note 150.
154. See SNS Definitions, supra note 17, at 213.
155. For nearly twenty years, trademark law has governed disputes over rights to domain
names. Trademark law was initially not a good fit for disputes over domain names because
both claims of trademark infringement and trademark dilution require that the plaintiff prove
that the defendant use the mark in commerce. Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and
the Death of Common Sense, 108 YAL.E L.J. 1687, 1702 (1999). A "cybersquatter" could evade
the use in commerce requirement by "warehousing" the domain name-registering the dis-
puted domain name without using it. See S. RiEP. No. 106-140, at 7 (2002). The passage of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 1999, however, resolved this problem by cre-
ating a cause of action against registering trademarks as domain names even when the trade-
mark was not used in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § I125(d) (2011). In addition, a form of arbitration
loosely based on trademark law, the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Procedure
(UDRP), provides trademark holders another way to resolve disputes over domain names. See
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 148, § 25:74.75.
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that a trademark or signifier of personal identity may be deleted from a so-
cial network account without any technical effect on the links to the account,
easily eliminating potential liability.' 5 6
In this sense, the social network context is fundamentally different from
the web page context. In the web page context, URL links to a website point
to the domain name of the website.'5 7 When a plaintiff discovers that a third
party website is using a name to free ride on goodwill that the plaintiff cre-
ated, the plaintiff may simply claim that the website has infringed her trade-
mark. For example, the plaintiff may claim that her trademark rights in
"People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals" are infringed by a third party
using the domain name peta.org or that Julia Roberts's rights in her name are
infringed by a third party using the domain name juliaroberts.com. 55 By
obtaining an injunction against the use of these domain names, the plaintiff
prevents the website from free riding off the plaintiffs investment in good-
will in a brand.'5 9 Thus, in the web page context, trademark law enables the
rights holder to benefit from goodwill in the form of URL links to a
website.' 60
In the social network context, the problem is different. For example, in
PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the Twitter account at issue was initially named
156. This is true at least for the major social media platforms. See Editing Your Profile,
LINKIDIN, http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a id/5 (last visited Feb. 19, 2013); How
Do I Change My Name?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/173909489329079/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2013); How Do I Edit My Profile: Username, PINTERESr, https://
help.pinterest.com/entries/21047367-How-do-l-edit-my-profile-#usemame (last visited Feb.
19, 2013); How to Change Your Username: Follow These Steps to Change Your Username,
Twri-rrn, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/107-my-profile-account-
settings/articles/14609-how-to-change-your-usemame# (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) ("Changing
your username will not affect your existing followers, Direct Messages, or @replies. Your
followers will simply see a new usemame next to your profile photo when you update.").
157. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 148, § 25:72.
158. See People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 367 (4th
Cir. 2001); Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Case No. D2000-02 10,
2000 WL 33674395 (May 29, 2000) (Page & Bridgeman, Arbs.), available at http://
www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-02 I 0.html.
159. See, e.g., Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 267 F. Supp. 2d 505 (E.D.
Va. 2003) (finding domain names "GMATPLUS.com" and "GMATPLUS.net" for websites
advertising and selling GMAT test questions likely to cause confusion among consumers with
the registered and well-established trademarks owned by the plaintiff for graduate school ad-
missions tests). However, where the website itself is clearly not associated with the trademark
in dispute, some courts have found that use of the disputed trademark in the domain name does
not rise to trademark infringement and, for related reasons, that the use does not violate the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309,
316, 320 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that confusion must be determined by evaluating the accused
domain name in conjunction with the content of the Web site).
160. Rights in a domain name are limited by First Amendment rights and other limita-
tions to the trademark right. See, e.g., id. at 314 ("Congress left little doubt that it did not
intend for trademark laws to impinge the First Amendment rights of critics and
commentators.").
229Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:201
@PhoneDog-Noah.161 If Noah Kravitz had continued using the account after
leaving PhoneDog without changing the name, PhoneDog would have a
strong case for trademark infringement.162 Conversely, if PhoneDog took
possession of the Twitter account without changing the name, Kravitz might
have a claim for misappropriation of identity or right of publicity, especially
if other identifying features remained in the account, such as his picture.163
However, Kravitz avoided a trademark infringement suit by changing the
handle of the Twitter account to "@noahkravitz" after he left PhoneDog.'"
This change did not disrupt his followers' links to his account; all 17,000
followers remained connected.'16 Thus, in the social network context, Kra-
vitz could keep the links without infringing PhoneDog's trademark.
161. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
162. Again, a trademark infringement claim requires that the defendant use the plaintiffs
trademark in commerce in connection with goods or services in a way that is likely to cause
confusion among consumers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2011). Here, the use of the trademark
"PhoneDog" would likely confuse consumers as to whether PhoneDog was the source of the
tweets in the account. PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1; see also Maremont v. Susan
Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., 10 C 7811, 2011 WL 6101949, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011)
(employee's false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act survived a motion for summary
judgment where her employer posted messages under her Twitter handle and through her
Facebook page). The "use in commerce" element might be met if Kravitz used the account to
make advertising revenue, for example, by providing links to a site with paid advertising. See
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2011); Eric Goldman, supra note 45, at 414-24 (discussing differing
approaches to the use in commerce requirement). If Kravitz used the handle for purposes of
criticism and comment or perhaps parody of PhoneDog, however, he might have a free speech
defense to trademark infringement. See, e.g., Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 314.
163. Kravitz would likely have a prima facie claim that PhoneDog misappropriated his
identity by using his name. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983). Kravitz would also likely have a prima facie claim that PhoneDog
violated his right of publicity by profiting from the commercial value of his name. See, e.g.,
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir. 2003). For example, in Eagle v. Morgan,
the plaintiff succeeded in her claims for misappropriation of identity and misappropriation of
publicity because her former employer continued to use a LinkedIn account bearing the plain-
tiff's name after firing her. Eagle v. Morgan, 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 12, 2013). Furthermore, in Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, the plaintiff
claimed that her right of publicity was violated when her employer tweeted under her Twitter
handle. Maremont, 2011 WL 6101949, at *6. Her claim might have survived summary judg-
ment if the defendant's employees had not explained in the disputed tweets that they were in
fact not the plaintiff. See id. at *7. Finally, he might make a colorable claim of false endorse-
ment under the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2011); Maremont, 2011 WL 6101949,
at *5.
164. See PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1.
165. See First Amended Complaint at 3, PhoneDog, 2011 WL 6955632 ("Defendant has
used and continues to use the Account, by way of the handle @noahkravitz, to communicate
with PhoneDog's Followers without PhoneDog's permission."). The only change for the fol-
lowers is that Kravitz's tweets would appear under the handle "@noahkravitz" instead of
"@PhoneDogKravitz." See How to Change Your Username: Follow These Steps to Change
Your Username, TwITfER, https:/support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/107-my-
profile-account-settings/articles/14609-how-to-change-your-usemame# (last visited Feb. 19,
2013) ("Changing your usemrname will not affect your existing followers, Direct Messages, or
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If Kravitz instead had a website at the domain name
phonedog-noah.com, he would have faced a more difficult choice. He could
change the name of the website to noahkravitz.com, but then any URL links
to that website would be broken. Or he could retain the name and the links,
but PhoneDog would likely win a trademark suit claiming that the website's
domain name, phonedog-noah.com, infringed its trademark in
"PhoneDog."' 66 Instead, Kravitz lost none of the goodwill in the form of his
followers' links to the Twitter account while avoiding liability for trademark
infringement.167
Any lingering association in the minds of users between the account and
the trademark are not, and should not be, grounds for a trademark infringe-
ment claim. In PhoneDog, for example, some percentage of the account's
followers likely linked to the account because of the trademark "PhoneDog"
in the original handle of "@PhoneDogNoah," '6' but changing the name
should be adequate to remedy any likelihood of confusion.
As a threshold requirement, claims of trademark infringement and trade-
mark dilution require that the defendant use the mark.'6 9 Similarly, claims
for misappropriation of identity and violation of the right of publicity must
allege that the defendant used the plaintiffs identity.170 The boundaries of
the use requirement are a matter of controversy. With regard to trademarks,
courts have split on the question of whether use of a trademarked keyword to
trigger advertisements on search engines would qualify as a use in com-
merce because the trademark is not visible to end consumers."' In the mis-
appropriation of identity and right of publicity context, some courts have
held that uses which merely evoke the plaintiffs identity constituted ade-
@replies. Your followers will simply see a new usemame next to your profile photo when you
update."). Of course, some followers might have decided to unfollow the account when Kra-
vitz left PhoneDog, but the name change itself does not disrupt the links. See id.
166. See supra text accompanying note 158.
167. See PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1. Of course, changing the name of an ac-
count does have some effects on links. When the social network account name changes, web
links to the URL of the social network account no longer work. In addition, searches for that
particular handle using internet search engines are less likely to find the account. Accordingly,
the account's influence might be somewhat diminished. Nevertheless, the social network ac-
count still retains much of its value because the followers within the social network application
remain linked to the account. That is, although URL links to the social network account
webpage would be disrupted by an account name change, the links to Twitter followers would
remain undisturbed.
168. Id.
169. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(a)(1), I125(a)(1), I125(c)(1) (2011).
170. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11 th Cir. 1998);
RrsmtATMENr (SocoNo) oF ToRTs § 652C (1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPE-
TITON § 46 (1995).
171. See Eric Goldman, Keyword Law, ERIc GOLDMAN.ORG 5, http://
www.ericgoldman.org/Resources/keywordlaw.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
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quate uses to establish infringement.17 2 These holdings have been heavily
criticized."' However, even in these disputed cases at the edge of trademark
and personality rights, courts still require some form of use of the disputed
trademark or identity. Where the social network account holder deletes the
disputed name from the account, the account holder no longer uses the term
at all.' 7 4 Holding that no use constitutes infringement would go far beyond
172. See Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right To Evoke, 44 B.C. L. Riy. 291, 303-08
(2003).
173. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, Filling Two Gaps in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the Problem with Vanna, 47 S.C. L. Rv. 783,
804-07 (1996); Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'s Expan-
sion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 Nw. U.
L. Riv. 1189, 1194-97 (1995); Fred M. Weiler, Note, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A
Case for Privileged Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARoozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 258 (1994);
Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual
Characters, 20 CARiozo L. Riev. 355, 359-67 (1998).
174. The form of trademark infringement that comes closest to describing the confusion
at issue in social network cases may be initial interest confusion. Initial interest confusion
describes situations in which the defendant's use of a trademark that is confusingly similar to
that of the plaintiff diverts consumers to the defendant. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987). In the famous case of Grotrian v. Steinway
& Sons, for example, customers believed that pianos made by Grotrian Steinweg were related
to or came from the Steinway brand. Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Although consumers might not have been confused about the origin of Gro-
trian Steinweg pianos at the point of purchase, the Second Circuit held that the initial interest
confusion infringed Steinway's trademark. Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342
(2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit concluded that the initial confusion led some customers to
consider and eventually buy Gotrian Steinweg pianos, who would otherwise have considered
only Steinway pianos. See id.
The use of website domain names that are identical to or confusingly similar to trade-
marks presents a close analogy to the use of a trademark in the name of a social network
account. In many cases, courts have found defendants liable for trademark infringement under
a theory of initial interest confusing for using domains names that are confusingly similar to
the plaintiffs trademark. See, e.g., Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co., 194 F. Supp.
2d 704, 728-29 (S.D. Ohio 2002); N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric
Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). But see Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[C]onsumers don't form any firm
expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they've seen the landing page-if then.
This is sensible agnosticism, not consumer confusion. . . . So long as the site as a whole does
not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder, such momentary uncertainty
does not preclude a finding of nominative fair use.").
However, in the case of social network account names where the account holder changes
the name of the account upon leaving the trademark holder, there is no initial interest confu-
sion. When the social network holder is affiliated with the trademark holder and has permis-
sion to use the trademark, followers are not misled by the use of a trademark in the account
name. The account holder in fact may have permission to use the trademark. See, e.g.,
PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011) ("PhoneDog alleges that [a]s an employee of PhoneDog, [Mr. Kravitz] was given use of
and maintained the Twitter account @PhoneDogNoah . . . ." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Once the social network holder leaves the trademark holder and changes the account
name, the users are not confused by any erroneous use of a trademark. Because the confusion
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the bounds of even the most aggressive judicial opinions in this area.7 5 In
short, trademark law and personality rights provide a remedy for infringe-
ment of a trademark or name, but not for the loss of followers' links to a
social network account.
B. Proprietary Content: Copyright
Part of what makes an account valuable is the content in the account-
the postings, photographs, layout, descriptions, and so on-that the account
holder has spent time and effort to develop and which draws viewers to the
account. To the extent that the material is original, much of it would qualify
for copyright protection.7 6 But like trademark and personality rights law,
copyright law does not provide a means to regain access to the account or to
the links in that account.
First, a plaintiff with rights to copyrighted content in the account would
not have a straightforward claim of infringement against a defendant who
locked her out of the account. The new possessor of the account would not
violate copyright's exclusive right to copy because no copying occurs; the
content is already in the account.'77 The copyright owner might have better
success arguing that by continuing to operate the account without the copy-
right owner's permission, the account holder violates her exclusive right of
public display. 7 In some social network accounts, however, the content in
the account disappears with time. Only the most recent tweets in a Twitter
account, for example, remain visible.' 79 As a result, the plaintiff would only
does not revolve around use of a trademark, consumer confusion cannot rise to the level of
trademark infringement.
175. Under this reasoning, anybody who leaves a company with a trademark would have
to refrain from competition until no consumer associated her with the former employer, an
absurd and anticompetitive result.
176. Copyright protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2011). Copyright does not extend to preexisting material used
unlawfully in a compilation or derivative work. Id. § 103. Although a very short posting might
not be protected because copyright does not protect ideas alone, most postings, even tweets,
would be adequately expressive to merit copyright protection. Adam S. Nelson, Tweet Me
Fairly: Finding Attribution Rights Though Fair Use in the Twittersphere, 22 FORoHAM IN-
EEL. PROP. MEDIA & Ewr. L.J. 697, 724-27 (2012) (discussing the ability to copyright
tweets).
177. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011). Infringement of a copyright occurs when one of the
exclusive rights in the copyright is violated: the exclusive right to copy, make derivative
works, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display the work. Id. The plaintiff might
make an argument that the account user was secondarily liable for infringement by enabling
viewers to violate the right to copy by making automatic copies on their browsers each time
they view the account, but such use is typically considered either a fair use or a use subject to
an implied license. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725-26 (9th Cir.
2007).
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2011).
179. Get to Know Twitter: New User FAQ, Twi-rfl3R, https://support.twitter.com/articles/
13920-frequently-asked-questions#3200 (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) ("We store all your Tweets.
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have a limited claim for copyright infringement, but not a continuing claim
that could be used as a proxy for a claim to the account itself. Secondly, on
many social network platforms, the new account holder may simply delete
the copyrighted content, thereby obviating any copyright claim.'so Although
a copyright claim would provide some relief to the plaintiff in certain cases,
it fails to resolve the problem of rights to the links in the account.','
C. Non-Public Information: Trade Secrets and Privacy
In some cases, a party who takes over an account may violate privacy
and trade secret rights in nonpublic information in the account. With regard
to privacy law, the Fourth Amendment, privacy torts, and statutes-particu-
larly the Stored Communications Act ("SCA")182-address privacy in the
employment context. The critical inquiry under these laws is whether the
subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information or place at
issue.'" In a dispute between an employer and worker, the worker's private
You can click the Me tab to view up to 3200 of your most recent Tweets in your profile
timeline.") The material might be cached elsewhere on the internet, but this is not the work of
the new possessor of the account. See, e.g., TwimeMachine-Read and Search Your Old
Tweets, TwiME MACHINE, http://www.twimemachine.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
180. See, e.g., How to Delete a Tweet, TwrriER, http://support.twitter.com/entries/ 18906-
how-to-delete-a-tweet# (last visited Feb. 8, 2013); What Happens to Content (Posts, Pictures,
Etc) that I Delete from Facebook?, FACIBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/
356107851084108/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). The posting may remain in the social network's
memory, but at least they are no longer publicly displayed when removed.
181. Another claim that could be made based on the content in the account is a reverse
passing off claim under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261
(9th Cir. 1994); F.E.L. Publ'ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 10
(7th Cir. 1982). Reverse passing off is a form of unfair competition in which the defendant
misrepresents that it made a product when the product was actually made by the plaintiff.
Cleary, 30 F.3d at 1261. In this context, by taking over the account, the defendant may be
effectively representing to the public that it produced the content in the account when in fact
the plaintiff produced that content. See id. However, the Supreme Court's holding in Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), sheds doubt on the success of
a reverse passing off claim in this context. See id. at 37. The Supreme Court concluded that the
rights conferred by the Lanham Act belong to "the producer of the tangible goods that are
offered for sale" rather than "the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in
those goods." Id. The Court rejected the latter possible interpretation because it would effec-
tively grant copyright protection through the back door. Id. In the case of social network
accounts, there is no tangible good for sale. The social network account only contains commu-
nications. As the Supreme Court observed in Dastar, using the Lanham Act to protect commu-
nications alone would "creat[e] a species of perpetual . . . copyright," which exceeds the
constitutional limit on copyright protection. Id. In any case, as explained in the text, in some
accounts, this content will simply disappear; in others, it will be deleted. In any case, as ex-
plained in the text, in some accounts, this content will simply disappear; in others, it will be
deleted.
182. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712.
183. Fourth Amendment: O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724, 726 (1987) (holding
that an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace must be balanced
against the public employer's need to ensure that their agencies operated in an efficient and
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information would typically be the information at stake because the worker
would likely do the work of posting in the account.184 The law recognizes
that a worker may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in some spaces
at work under both public and private employers.'15
Whether a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in information
posted in a social network account, however, is a vexing question. Informa-
tion that is readily available to the public generally does not receive privacy
protections,18 6 and information in an account is typically available to multi-
ple parties. First, the social network provider generally has access to every-
thing posted in the account.'8 7 Second, a host of advertisers may also have
effective manner); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from government searches violating
a reasonable expectation of privacy). Privacy torts: Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97,
101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that a claim of invasion of privacy under the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion against an employer requires a showing that the employer invaded a reasonable
expectation of privacy). The Stored Communications Act ("SCA") prohibits the intentional
access of electronic communications in storage. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2011). Although a
plaintiff need not demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages at issue, the
SCA requires that the plaintiff show that the messages are not "readily accessible to the gen-
eral public." Id. § 2511(2)(g)(i); see also, e.g., Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1321
(1 Ith Cir. 2006) ("[Tlhe requirement that the electronic communication not be readily accessi-
ble by the general public is material and essential to recovery under the SCA.").
184. Of course, one could imagine a situation in which the employer's private informa-
tion or perhaps another worker's private information was posted in the account.
185. See, e.g., O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 718-19 (holding that the employee of a public
employer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets); Dir. of Office
of Thrift Supervision v. Ernst & Young, 795 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1992) (applying similar
analysis to a private employer); see also Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650,
663 (D.N.J. 2010) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in a private employee's pass-
word-protected, web-based e-mail account, accessed on a company laptop).
186. In O'Connor, the Supreme Court noted that an individual loses his reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in spaces that are open to others. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717-18 (recog-
nizing that spaces that are "continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during
the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits," can be "so open to
fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable"); see also City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010). States have come to similar conclusions re-
garding information available to the public. See, e.g., Ernst & Young, 795 F. Supp. at 10
(applying the O'Connor standard to the question of employee privacy in diaries containing
personal and company data). Moreover, messages that are "readily accessible to the general
public" receive no protection under the SCA. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp.
2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing briefly the extent to which private messages and
postings on Facebook and MySpace pages might meet the SCA's not "readily accessible"
requirement).
1 87. See, e.g., Data Use Policy: Information We Receive About You, FAcvnooK, http://
www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) ("We receive a num-
ber of different types of information about you, including: . . . [r]egistration information . . .
[i]nformation you choose to share . . . [i]nformation others share about you . . . ."); Twitter
Privacy Policy, TwrrrnR, https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) ("We collect
and use your information ... to provide our Services and to measure and improve them over
time.").
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access to the information.'"" Third, the followers linked to the account have
access to at least some of the postings.'8 9 In some cases, these followers may
number in the thousands, even the millions. 90 The question is whether, and
at what point, information posted in an account qualifies for privacy
protections.
The fact that an individual chooses to share information or a space with
some parties does not necessarily destroy his reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to other parties.' 9' Under the Fourth Amendment, the fact
that an individual shares a space with others does not always obviate her
reasonable expectation of privacy in that space.192 For example, the Supreme
Court held in Mancusi v. DeForte, that an individual may retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a shared office. 93 Similarly, the Northern District
of Illinois found that a television station might be liable under the privacy
tort of intrusion upon seclusion for broadcasting film of a prisoner exercising
in a prison gym visible to others in the prison.194 The court observed that the
"[plaintiffs] visibility to some people does not strip him of the right to re-
main secluded from others."'19 Finally, courts have held that plaintiffs may
maintain claims for violation of the SCA where employers accessed web-
188. See Emily Steel & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook, MySpace Confront Privacy
Loophole, WALL Sr. J. (May 21, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl000l4240527487045
13104575256701215465596.html.
189. See, e.g., How to Post & Share, FACIOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
333140160100643/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (see "When I share something, how do I
choose who can see it?" under "Privacy Controls for Stories You Share").
190. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011) (17,000 followers); Palis, supra note 8 (over 49 million followers). Other functions in a
social network account vary in their claim to privacy. Registration information, such as birth-
day, full name, and address may be available to no one other than the social network provider.
Although a posting may be visible to the public at large, a private message sent through the
same social network may be visible only to the recipient and the social network provider. In
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, for example, the court distinguished
private messaging services on Facebook with postings on completely public electronic bulletin
boards in evaluating the accessibility of messages under the SCA's readily accessible standard.
Id. at 981-82.
191. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF EMPILoYMENT: EMPLOYEE PRIVACY AND Au-
rONOMY § 7.04 cmt. d, illus. 4 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2012).
192. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968).
193. Id.
194. Huskey v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1287-88 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also
Stessman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Iowa 1987) (holding that a
television station might be liable under the tort of intrusion upon seclusion for broadcasting a
film of a woman eating in a public restaurant).
195. Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1288; see Adam Pabarcus, Are "Private" Spaces on Social
Networking Websites Truly Private? The Extension of Intrusion upon Seclusion, 38 Wm.
MIfCHELL L. REv. 397, 412-14 (2011).
236
A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights
sites without authorization even though the websites were accessible to other
parties. 196
Although courts have held that unauthorized access of websites with
restricted access, including social network accounts, would violate the SCA
under some circumstances, 9 7 the question is open as to whether claims
against such intrusions would succeed under the Fourth Amendment or as
privacy tort claims.'9 Some commentators argue that privacy protections
should apply to social network accounts at least when the information is
only available to a restricted set of viewers.'" This logic can be applied not
only to the account holder, but also to other users. Private communications
from members of the account holder's network to the account holder may
also deserve protection for the same reasons. For example, if a "friend" on
Facebook sends a private message to me through Facebook, it seems that the
"friend's" reasonable expectation of privacy in that message should be pro-
tected, perhaps not from me, but from unauthorized intrusions by others.2 00
Effectively, another user should not be tricked into thinking that a public
venue is a private venue.
Trade secret law protects information from misappropriation which con-
fers an independent economic advantage due to the fact that it is not gener-
ally known or readily ascertainable to competitors. 20' To qualify for
196. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002);
Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. 2009).
197. See, e.g., Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the court might consider a website not readily accessible to the public if the website holder
screened users before granting them access to the website); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc.,
717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that compelling disclosure of Facebook
wall and MySpace comments would violate the SCA if access to such comments was re-
stricted); Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (deny-
ing motion to compel disclosure of YouTube videos when videos could only be viewed by
others authorized by the user who posted them).
198. See Patricia Sanchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the
Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 63, 74-77 (2012).
199. E.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IowA L. Rev. 1137, 1195-97
(2009); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF- EMPi.OYMFNr § 7.04 cmt. d, ill. 4 (Tentative Draft
5, 2012). See generally Pabarcus, supra note 195 (arguing that the common law tort of intru-
sion upon seclusion should apply to the unauthorized access to information posted on social
networking sites in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy).
200. See Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 Micn. L. Rv. 561,
588-90 (2009) (arguing that giving information to a third party may indicate consent to disclo-
sure by that party but should not necessarily destroy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information with regard to other parties).
201. See UNII. TRADE SBCREns AcT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). "'Trade secret' means infor-
mation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or pro-
cess, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Id. UTSA has been adopted in
most states. I ROGiER M. MILGRIM & ERic E. BiNsiN, MuGRIM ON TRADE SECRrTS
237Spring 2013]1
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:201
protection, the trade secret holder must additionally make reasonable efforts
to maintain secrecy of the information. 2012 Links to an account would seem to
be obvious candidates for trade secret protection because they bear a close
resemblance to customer lists. Courts often protect employers' customer lists
as trade secrets where the customer information is not readily ascertainable
from outside sources.2013 In some circumstances, the links to an account
might meet this standard. For example, where the names of customers linked
to a social network account could only be accessed through the account and
were not otherwise generally known, the list of people linked to the account
might qualify as a trade secret.204
Many social network accounts, however, only contain information avail-
able to the public at large. Not only the account profile, but also the links to
the profiles of all the followers of a Twitter or Pinterest account, for exam-
ple, may be viewed publicly. 2015 More fundamentally, the rights in trade
secrets and privacy may preclude access to nonpublic information, but they
do not necessarily preclude access to a social network account. Even if a
court found that every fact militated in favor of the employer-for example,
that the employer had paid the worker to create the account and had con-
trolled every aspect of its use-the existence of a trade secret or a private
comment in the account should not be a reason against transferring the ac-
count to the employer. The former worker can simply delete the private or
trade secret information before giving the employer access to the account.
Thus, a key point in all these legal paradigms is that the information at
issue can be largely disaggregated from the account itself. On the one hand,
this point simplifies the resolution of disputes over social network accounts
because the legal rights can be resolved independently of the dispute over
§ 101[2][b] (2011) (providing a table of jurisdictions where the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has
been adopted).
202. See UNiw. TRADE SECREls Acr, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
203. See, e.g., Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1115 (10th Cir. 2009). Factors
militating toward trade secret protection are:
(1) whether proper and reasonable steps were taken by the owner to protect the
secrecy of the information; (2) whether access to the information was restricted; (3)
whether employees knew customers' names from general experience; (4) whether
customers commonly dealt with more than one supplier; (5) whether customer infor-
mation could be readily obtained from public directories; (6) whether customer in-
formation is readily ascertainable from sources outside the owner's business; (7)
whether the owner of the customer list expended great cost and effort over a consid-
erable period of time to develop the files; and (8) whether it would be difficult for a
competitor to duplicate the information.
Id. Jurisdictions vary in the degree of protection that courts grant customer lists. See Dicks v.
Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Vt. 2001) (discussing variation among jurisdictions, and
even within the same jurisdiction, in the protection of customer lists as trade secrets).
204. See Hertz, 576 F.3d at 1115.
205. Secret Boards 101, PINT EREs r, https://help.pinterest.comlentries/22277603-Secret-
Boards-101 (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
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access to the account, at least to the extent that the content at issue can be
separated from the account. On the other hand, these legal paradigms fail to
provide a simple and straightforward solution to the problem of which party
has the right to the account itself. Unlike the web page context, trademark
law does not provide a means to claim rights in the account in the way that it
provides a mechanism to claim a disputed domain name. Therefore, the solu-
tion to the problem of access to the account must be found elsewhere.
Nevertheless, to the extent that information cannot be disaggregated
from the account, any solution must address issues arising under the legal
paradigms discussed above. For example, where copyrighted or private in-
formation belonging to the previous account holder cannot be deleted or
does not disappear, the resolution of a dispute regarding access to the links
must accommodate copyright and privacy rights. Aside from these concerns,
the problem of how to resolve disputes over access to social network ac-
counts may be analyzed on its own terms.
D. Public Interests at Stake in Social Networking
This section considers the problem of rights in a social network account
from a public interest standpoint. Participation in social network platforms
promotes the public interest by enhancing the free flow of information, im-
proving social cohesion, and increasing economic efficiency and dynamism.
To optimize benefits to the public, the best solution will provide incentives
for beneficial participation in social network platforms.
1. Informational Benefits from Participation in Social Network Platforms
The use of social network platforms by workers and employers en-
hances the flow of information not only to the public but also from and
among the public. 2016 As a general matter, the free flow of communication
furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of informa-
tion. 2017 Participation in social network platforms leads to a number of spe-
cific informational advantages. Further, the blending of personal and
professional use tends to increase these advantages.
First, social network use improves the flow of commercial information
to consumers in ways that are particularly convenient and useful for consum-
ers.20'8 Because consumers exercise more control over the flow of informa-
tion on social network platforms than they do in traditional media channels,
consumers are more likely to benefit from the information they receive.
206. YOCHAl BENKLER, THE WEALTH oiF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCION TRANS-
FORMS MARKETIS AN) FREIEOM 25 (2006).
207. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980).
208. See Robert Hainer, What Are the Benefits for Customers of Major Companies Using
Social Media?, Hous. CHRON., http://smalibusiness.chron.com/benefits-customers-major-com
panies-using-social-media-29682.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).
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Whereas the listener may simply ignore the bombardment of unwanted and
irrelevant advertising from a broadcast medium, such as a radio station, the
user may read the social network feeds she has chosen to follow with real
interest and attention.
The voluntary nature of a consumer's decision to link to a social net-
work account alone indicates that the companies which successfully partici-
pate in social network platforms provide valuable information to their
followers. Why else would consumers choose to follow them? If the incen-
tive for companies to provide this valuable information is to attract follow-
ers, then this incentive should be preserved.
Secondly, network effects amplify the advantages of disseminating in-
formation through social network platforms. An individual is likely to find
particularly useful the information passed to her through a network of people
she trusts and with whom she shares common interests. 209 These network
effects not only help consumers but also contribute to the more efficient
functioning of the market as a whole. As Professor McGeveran observed in
his article on marketing through social network platforms, "markets function
better when individual consumer purchasing decisions rely on improved in-
formation, as they do in an environment saturated with accessible and rele-
vant peer opinions."21 0
A third benefit is the ease and efficiency with which users obtain an-
swers to questions through social network platforms. 211 A consumer can sim-
ply respond to a posting from a company she follows with a question. 212 The
convenience of this feature is just one of the advantages. 213 In addition, com-
panies are more likely to respond to questions on social network platforms
209. For example, a mother may find it valuable to know that other mothers with simi-
larly aged children 'liked' a specific article about child-rearing or decided to follow a particu-
lar children's clothing company. See McGeveran, supra note 44, at 1110 ("Most
fundamentally, however, word of mouth influences consumers' decisions because they believe
it: a recommendation from a disinterested person similar to the consumer is likely to be 'im-
mediate, personal, credible, and relevant."').
210. Id. at 1113.
211. HowE, supra note 53, at 16-17.
212. Consider this exchange with Aaron Baker on Twitter, in which a follower directly
asks Baker a technical question and Baker in turn provides a direct response:
Josh Anderson @THECATZMEOW_2
@PhoneDog.Aaron aaron how do u feel about the Hic one x? I like it but what do
u think of it?
Aaron Baker @PhoneDogAaron
@THECATZ MEOW_2 Great Android phone-even better at $99.99
Josh Anderson & Aaron Baker, @PhoneDogAaron, TWITTER (Aug. 3, 2012, 4:44 AM),
https:/twitter.com/PhoneDogAaron/status/231412639136362496.
213. See Hainer, supra note 208; Special Report: New Reality Demands a Response,
MARKETING, Oct. 26, 2011, at 37.
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because both the question and answer are more visible.2 14 On a public
Facebook page, for example, anyone can see the question and the response.
This visibility increases the company's incentive to answer (and to answer
promptly) in order to build a reputation for providing helpful customer ser-
vice.215 Visibility also amplifies the helpfulness of the answer because other
consumers with similar questions can see the answer too.2 16 This saves the
company time and money because it need not repeatedly provide the same
answer as it would in a less visible format, such as a customer service call or
individual chat.2 17 In an efficient market, these savings are passed on to the
public.
Fourth, the public benefits when customers provide feedback in terms of
questions and comments to companies. 218 Companies have always solicited
customer feedback, but social network platforms vastly increase the amount
of input available to companies by providing a forum for a conversation
among thousands of people. 2 9 The public gains when companies deliver
products and services better suited to consumers' needs. 2 20
The benefits to the public are even greater when employers use their
workers to personally engage with the public on their behalf. As described
above, companies promote the public interest in the free flow of information
by engaging in social network platforms in two principal ways: by facilitat-
ing the flow of convenient and useful commercial information to consumers,
and by providing massive amounts of feedback for companies. Neither of
214. Alan Henry, Get Big Companies to Pay Attention to Your Complaints with These
Five Steps, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/get-big-companies-
to-pay-attention-to-your-complaints-with-these-five-steps-2012-3.
215. See id.
216. Alexandra Reid, Customers Won't Come Just Because You're on Social Media,
Bus. INSIDER (June 9, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-06-09/strategy/
30063170 1 social-media-startups-can-customer-service ("You can share a solution with eve-
ryone who has the same question on a platform instead of addressing each individual
separately.").
217. See id.; Natalie Petouhoff & Kathy Herrmann, Calculating the ROI for Social Cus-
tomer Service: How to Combine Strategy with ROI to Accelerate Executive Approval, SAt ES-
FORcE (May 2011), https://secure2.sfdcstatic.com/assets/pdf/misc/SocialCustomerROI_
Guide.pdf.
218. See Hainer, supra note 208 ("When a company you follow sends out a poll or asks
for opinions on a new product through social media, your response can help shape the future of
that product or idea by voting for or against it.").
219. Robert Wollan, As Fewer Consumers Switch Service Providers, CMOs Must Piece
Together the Customer-Loyalty Puzzle, AovIRTIsING AGE (Apr. 20, 2011), http://
www.adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/cmos-advantage-customer-service-dissatisfaction/
227108/ ("Social-media monitoring also provides unfiltered feedback from customers on a
scale that focus groups and surveys alone simply cannot provide."); JAN ZIMMERMAN & DOUG
SAHLIN, SoCIAL MEDIA MARKETING At--IN-ONE FOR Dummns 85, 123, 470 (2010).
220. Hown, supra note 53, at 2. Further, this feedback is easy to collect and analyze
because it is digital, written, and publicly available; it is essentially a large, easily searchable
database of information, which helps companies refine and improve their products. Clifford,
supra note 54.
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these advantages can occur, however, unless consumers choose to engage
with companies on social network platforms. As discussed in Part I, consum-
ers are more likely to do so when they feel a personal connection with a real
person. The personal connection improves the flow of information in both
directions-members of the public will be more inclined not only to follow
but also to respond to an account when it is operated by a real person.
2. Public Benefits from Workers' Participation in
Social Network Platforms
Workers benefit themselves and the public when they enhance their
skills through social network participation. Workers improve their skills in at
least three ways. First, they develop their proficiency at using social network
platforms by learning how to use the various services and speak in the mode
appropriate to each. 221 Given the trend toward commercial use of social net-
work platforms, 222 an employer might find this specifically valuable. Sec-
ond, a worker might use an account to develop her "personal brand": some
combination of personal style, expertise, and perspective that other social
network users find useful or interesting. 2 3 These two skill sets promote the
public interest by improving the worker's ability to communicate. Finally, a
worker might also use social networking to enhance more traditional skills.
A worker's social network might provide her with mentoring, advice, indus-
try news, and educational opportunities. 224
In a fluid market, a worker's investment in developing her own profes-
sional abilities benefits the worker by increasing her compensation. 2 5 The
worker may either go to an employer who will pay her more or leverage her
outside opportunities to demand greater compensation from her current em-
ployer.226 The worker's enhanced abilities also provide the employer more
221. Marwick & boyd, supra note 69, at 118.
222. See supra Part L.A.
223. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Madeline Kriescher, Professional Benefits of Online Social Networking,
38 Coi-o. LAW. 61, 61-62 (2009), available at http://www.aallnet.org/chapter/coalllrc/
IrcO209.pdf.; Xeni Jardin, Online Social Networks Go to Work, NBC NEWs (Feb. 4, 2008),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5488683#.URxnWGAcpD4.
225. See generally Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh & Lee Fleming, Regional Disadvantage?
Non-Compete Agreements and Brain Drain (Sept. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/others/FlemingMarxSingh I l-braindrainI00925.pdf.
226. See Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Com-
mentary on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMir. RTs. & Emir. Pol "' J. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 27), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2060621.
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value.227 The increase in a worker's productivity due to enhanced skills fur-
thers the public interest at large by increasing economic efficiency. 228
3. Public Benefits from Providers' Investment in
Social Network Platforms
Due to the public benefits from social networks generally, any solution
should be careful to avoid unnecessarily discouraging companies from pro-
viding these services. In addition to the various commercial benefits de-
scribed above, social networking contributes to the public good in many
ways. On balance, it appears to promote social cohesion and civic engage-
ment.2 29 Online social networking is correlated with closer friendships, more
social support, and greater political participation. 23 () Studies suggest that use
of these sites facilitates networking, decreases the costs of communication,
and makes it easier to find information. 231 Moreover, social network plat-
forms give people a new power to effect social change. The successes of the
revolutions in the Middle East illustrates the potential for using social net-
work platforms to help people organize, create a sense of solidarity, and
rally others to a cause.23 2
As a result, the law should encourage social network providers to pro-
vide their services. Relying on providers to forestall or resolve disputes over
social network accounts, however, would likely burden them too much.
Moreover, service providers would not be well positioned to adequately re-
227. In a perfectly fluid market, the employer would not receive a benefit because it
would pay the worker exactly what the additional skills are worth. Nevertheless, because a
worker's self-investment typically benefits the employer more than the employer's investment
in the worker, the worker's initiative to improve herself may benefit the employer by saving it
the resources necessary to train the worker itself. See Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind:
Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 47 J. L. ECoN. &
ORG. 376 (2009).
228. See HUMAN CAPITAL AN) AMERICA'S FuTURE: AN EcONOMIC STRATEGY FOR THE
NINErIES 3-4 (David Hombeck & Lester M. Salamon eds., 1991); see generally Theodore W.
Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. EcON. REv. 1, 1-17 (1961) (discussing the
effect of investments in human capital on economic growth).
229. Janna Q. Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Social Relations, PEw INTERNET 2
(July 2, 2010), http://pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIPFutureofIntemet
%202010 social relations.pdf.
230. See Keith N. Hapton et al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, PEW INTERNET
25, 28, 39 (June 16, 2012), http://pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/201 1/PIP%20-%20
Social%20networking%20sites%20and%20our%201ives.pdf (finding that most social network
users are Facebook users and Facebook users tend to have more close connections, use social
media to maintain those connections, and tend to be more politically engaged than similar
demographics).
231. Anderson & Rainie, supra note 229, at 2.
232. See generally, Noureddine Miladi, New Media and the Arab Revolution: Citizen
Reporters and Social Activism, 4 J. ARAn & MuSLIM MEDIA RES. 113 (2011); Jon B. Al-
terman, The Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, WASH. Q., Fall 2011, at 103 (arguing that partic-
ipation in social media, including social networks, played a significant, though limited, role in
the Middle East movements in 2011).
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solve disputes. Social network platform providers might seem to be best
placed to both forestall and resolve disputes because they write the code that
structures the social network and the terms of use for using it. Moreover,
they have an incentive to avoid disputes to prevent dissatisfaction among
their subscribers. 233 Due to the nature of disputes over access to social net-
work accounts, however, software and terms of use are largely ineffective
tools for forestalling and settling disagreements.
Social network providers have two tools at their disposal for resolving
or preempting disputes over rights to accounts: code 234 and contract. As so-
cial networking sites are currently structured, the primary software tool for
controlling access to the site is the password.235 But passwords are inade-
quate to prevent disputes or to ensure that the party which has invested the
most in the account retains access to the account.
Typically, any party with access to the password can lock the other party
out of the account simply by changing the password. 236 As a result, knowl-
edge of the password is not necessarily a proxy for rights to the account in
any situation in which access is shared. 237 And access must be shared when
an organization attempts to use a social network because the organization
relies on employees to do the work on behalf of the incorporeal entity. Em-
ployers are particularly vulnerable in this regard. However, employees are
vulnerable in a different way. Although an employee does not have to physi-
cally share the password with the employer, they often lack power in the
employment relationship. 238 If the employer demands access, many employ-
ees will be unlikely to refuse.2 39
233. Most social networking sites work under an advertising model in which more sub-
scribers lead to more advertising revenues. Money from Friends: Finding the Right Revenue
Model for Social Media, KNOWLDG@WHAR ION (Aug. 29, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=3064.
234. See generally LAWRENCE LiESsiG, CoiE is LAW (2006) (arguing that cyberspace
may be regulated through computer code).
235. As of this writing, there are hundreds of social networking sites. See SNS Defini-
tions, supra note 17, at 210.
236. The ease with which this may be done depends on the extent of security protections
in the account. Sometimes changing the password requires access to an email account. De-
pending again on the security protections, someone with access to the account could change
the email account associated with the account. The more fundamental point is that in an em-
ployment context of shared access, the parties may also have access to the same email account.
237. One could imagine a social network which required a user to affirm on whose behalf
any action was taken, but given the competition to attract users, it seems unlikely that any site
would be designed in such a burdensome and inconvenient manner.
238. James R. Glenn, Can Friendly Go Too Far? Ramifications of the NLRA on Em-
ployer Practices in a Digital World, 2012 U. lu. J.L. TECH. & PoL'Y 219, 220; Robert
Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life and the
Employment Relationship, 50 U. LouisvILu L. REv. 1, 18 (2011).
239. See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at
*3 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding that an employee felt coerced, because of her employee status, to
give her employer the password to her social network account); Senators Question Employer
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Social network providers may also regulate users by contract. Invaria-
bly, providers post user agreements on their web sites which set the terms
under which users may use the services. 24() The provider typically retains the
right not only to terminate a user who violates the terms of use, but also to
terminate a user at will. 24 1 Therefore, the provider usually has the power by
contract to resolve disputes by terminating or transferring the accounts of
users who misbehave. 242
Their position as providers, however, gives them little advantage in de-
termining the merits of the case. Specifically, the provider cannot know on
whose behalf an account is opened or operated. To use the example of Sonya
Soutus from Part I.C, it is unclear from the Twitter account itself what agree-
ment she might have with her employer, Coca-Cola, regarding the account.
Even if she registered the account under her name, used it to discuss per-
sonal matters, and included her name in the handle "@SonyaSCocaCola,"
she may still have agreed to create the account for Coca-Cola, and Coca-
Cola may have compensated her very well for her labor. 243
Requests for Facebook Passwords, N.Y. TIMis (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/26/technology/senators-want-employers-facebook-password-requests-reviewed.html.
To combat the problem of employees involuntarily consenting to give their employees access
to social network accounts, the state of Illinois recently passed a law prohibiting employers
from demanding social network account passwords from their employees. Ill. Legis. Serv. 097-
0875 (West 2012).
240. Such contracts are generally deemed enforceable. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401-03 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that where the terms of use were
clearly posted on the website, the user manifested assent by using the web site services).
241. See, e.g., Terms of Service § 4.c, PINTERESr, http://pinterest.com/about/terms/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("We may permanently or temporarily terminate or suspend your User
account or access to the Service for any reason, without notice or liability to you, including if
in our sole determination you violate any provision of our Acceptable Use Policy or these
Terms, or for no reason."); Terms of Service § 8, TwrrfiER, https://twitter.com/tos/(last visited
Feb. 20, 2013) ("We reserve the right at all times ... to suspend or terminate users, and to
reclaim usernames without liability to you."); User Agreement § 7.1, LINKEDIN, http://
www.linkedin.com/static?key=user-agreement (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("Linkedln may ter-
minate the Agreement and your account for any reason or no reason, at any time, with or
without notice.").
242. Some sites explicitly claim this right. E.g., User Agreement, LINKEDIN § 4.4, http://
www.linkedin.com/static?key=user-agreement (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("Linkedin reserves
the right, but has no obligation, to monitor disputes between you and other members and to
restrict, suspend, or close your account if Linkedln determines, in our sole discretion, that
doing so is necessary to enforce this Agreement.").
243. The social network provider might set a rule that the account must be named after
the party on whose behalf it is opened, but such a rule would not resolve all disputes. A
company may want multiple accounts and it cannot give them all the same name. What hap-
pens when the account name includes both the worker and the company's name, such as
"@PhoneDogNoah" or "@SonyaSCocaCola"? The larger issue is that companies want ac-
counts which showcase the individual worker and, therefore, it is hard to tell from the account
itself on whose behalf the account is created. Without some knowledge of the agreement be-
tween the employer and worker, it is hard to resolve these disputes.
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The underlying problem is that social network providers are not well-
placed to resolve disputes about rights to social network accounts. The core
competency of providers is providing social network services, not dispens-
ing justice. They are particularly ill-equipped to deal with the array of com-
plex issues at stake in disputes over social network accounts, such as
incentives to invest, employer-employee contracts, and rights that stem from
privacy, trademark, and copyright law. Indeed, the efforts of social network
providers to resolve disputes in other contexts have been poor at best.244 As a
result, the parties should have recourse to the courts, as they are better suited
to resolve the problem. Therefore, any solution should offer the parties a
legal cause of action they can bring to court. Whether or not the parties
actually choose to go to court, the existence of a legal framework for resolv-
ing disputes would at least give the parties guidance on how to settle their
disputes and how to avoid them in the first place.
Nevertheless, social network providers have an interest in resolving
these disputes because the public is more likely to use their services if users
feel that their investments in the media will be protected from misappropria-
tion and that disputes will be resolved fairly. 245 Accordingly, without some
other source of dispute resolution, providers may feel compelled to resolve
disputes themselves, which would impose undesirable costs on their busi-
nesses. 246 To the extent that social network platforms are valuable services, it
244. See e.g., Black Sheep Television, Ltd. v. Town of Islip, No. 2:1O-CV-04926, 2010
WL 4961669, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (The court ordered a preliminary injunction en-
joining plaintiffs from use of their four Twitter accounts after defendant had initially attempted
to use Twitter's trademark infringement complaint mechanism which only resulted in the take-
down of one of the four user names.); Jillian Bluestone, La Russa's Loophole: Trademark
Infringement Lawsuits and Social Networks, 17 VILu. SPoRrs & ENr. L.J. 573, 576 (2010);
Daniel Solove, Facebook Banishment and Due Process, CONCURRING OPINIoNs (Mar. 3,
2008), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/03/facebookbanish.html (describ-
ing the predicament of one Facebook user whose profile was inexplicably deleted).
245. The fact that social network platforms typically have terms of use stating that the
provider retains all right to the services does not indicate in itself that social network providers
are averse to resolution by a court. To the contrary, the terms of use indicate the providers'
desire to avoid both disputes and liability. E.g., Myspace.com Terms of Use Agreement, Mys-
PACE § II (May 9, 2012), http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms ("You are solely responsible
for your interactions with other Myspace Users, third party developers or any other parties
with whom you interact through the Myspace Services and/or Linked Services. Myspace
reserves the right, but has no obligation, to become involved in any way with these disputes.");
User Agreement, LINKEDIN § 4.4, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=user-agreement (last
visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("LinkedIn reserves the right, but has no obligation, to monitor disputes
between you and other members and to restrict, suspend, or close your account if Linkedin
determines, in our sole discretion, that doing so is necessary to enforce this Agreement.").
What the social network providers most likely want is resolution of disputes without incurring
any additional responsibilities. To this end, courts should be wary of interpreting the law in a
way that imposes unnecessary burdens on social network providers.
246. Another possible solution is an arbitration procedure resembling the uniform do-
main name dispute resolution procedure (UDRP) for websites. Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTE RNEr CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS (Mar. 1,
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makes sense to avoid imposing additional burdens on the businesses that
provide them. Such burdens may increase the cost of doing business and
pose a hurdle to the creation of new or improved social network services.
Thus, protecting social-network service providers' incentives to invest re-
quires creating an adequate opportunity to resolve disputes in court.
4. Benefiting the Public by Preserving Incentives to Invest in
Social Network Platforms
The implication of all the advantages offered by employers' and work-
ers' participation in these sites is that the principal parties-employers,
workers, and social network providers-should retain their incentives to in-
vest in social network platforms. 247 Further, because blurred professional and
personal use enhances these benefits, the solution should not penalize such
combined use.
First, employers and workers should have recourse when an account is
wrongfully taken from them, specifically for the value of access to the fol-
lowers of the account. As explained in Part I, for most purposes, the links to
followers are the real attraction of the account. Creating an audience of fol-
lowers is one of the primary reasons employers and individuals invest time
2010), http://www.icann.orglen/help/dndr/udrp/rules; see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 148, at
§ 25:74.75 (describing the UDRP process). Social network providers, like registrars, could be
required, or perhaps merely encouraged by the FTC, to include a clause in their terms of use
binding all users to a dispute resolution procedure. Id. The parties could then take their dispute
to a neutral third party arbitrator under some form of established procedure. Id. The arbitrator
would be empowered to provide remedies such as transferring or canceling an account, which
the social network provider would be obligated to execute. Id.
Even if there were some form of arbitration available to social network users, however,
they should, as in the website domain name context, also have the option of taking disputes to
court for a full hearing. See, e.g., Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d
505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("First, ICANN's policy, rules and complaint form do not state that
a complainant gives up the right to proceed in court by filing a domain name dispute com-
plaint."). Although a UDRP-like arbitration might be cheaper and faster than proceedings in
court, the trade-off is a less developed record and a less nuanced examination of the issues. See
A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-Causes and (Partial)
Cures, 67 BROOK. L. Riv. 605, 670-71 (2002).
247. Use of social networks may also have negative social effects. A Pew Research
Center study found that internet experts and leaders worried that internet use fosters meaning-
less, shallow relationships, invasions of privacy, and intolerance. See Anderson & Rainie,
supra note 229, at 2. A follow-up study of social network use, however, suggested that social
network use did not appear correlated with an increase in shallow relationships and intoler-
ance. See Hapton et al., supra note 230, at 22, 34. Nevertheless, the loss of privacy resulting
from sharing personal details on social networks remains a concern. See Lauren Gelman, Pri-
vacy, Free Speech, and "Blurry-Edged" Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. Riv. 1315, 1330-35
(2009) (describing the tendency of internet users to release details intended for a small online
social network to the public); Grimmelmann, supra note 199, at 1160-75 (describing the
harms resulting from the posting of private information on Facebook).
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and effort into social network accounts. 248 To preserve their incentive to in-
vest in social network accounts-and the public benefits of this invest-
ment-the parties must have a legal remedy for loss of access to the
followers.2 49
An adequate remedy for some plaintiffs might take the form of mone-
tary damages or restitution. For other plaintiffs, however, the only adequate
remedy may be regaining access to the account itself. This is likely to be
particularly true in these disputes because it is very difficult to measure the
return on investment in the context of social network platforms and therefore
the worth to a party of a social network account. 250 It is even more difficult
to measure the value of the account when it is transferred, since some num-
ber of followers may decide to delink. 2SI For some plaintiffs, therefore, the
burden of establishing the monetary value of the account will be too heavy.
Those plaintiffs should have the option of relief in the form of the account
itself.
Finally, in order to preserve incentives to invest, the party that princi-
pally invested in the account should have the superior right to the account.
Thus, if the employer has paid the worker to attract followers to an account,
the employer's investment should be protected. Likewise, if the worker did
the work independently without compensation, the worker's investment
should be protected. It is not always clear on whose behalf the work was
performed. Nevertheless, the best solution for the public interest from the
standpoint of incentives would tease out which party would be unjustly en-
riched by being awarded the social network account and which party would
be unfairly harmed by losing it.
III. THE SOLUTION
At heart, the problem is that none of the legal paradigms surveyed pro-
vides protection for exclusive access to the links in an account. Particularly
in the employment context, the employer or worker can easily take an ac-
count, leaving the other party with no legal recourse despite the loss of con-
siderable investment to build a following. The risk of losing the account
reduces incentives to put effort into building a following. And public interest
248. In commercial terms, the account is valuable because of the audience it reaches. The
audience may also be valuable because the account holder wishes to communicate a message,
perhaps for ideological reasons, such as an anti-abortion message, or for political reasons, such
as campaign advertisements. For purposes of simplicity, however, this Article focuses on the
commercial value of the account.
249. See supra Part I.A-C.
250. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 36, at 145-48.
251. See supra Part I.E. Furthermore, it is equally, if not more, difficult to determine the
cost of reproducing that following in a new account. Again, an individual's decision to follow
an account is voluntary. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. It is hard to know what
level of effort and what type of content and how much time will be required to persuade social
network users to follow a particular account. See supra note 1I3 and accompanying text.
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suffers as a result because of the significant benefits that social network
platforms provide to society. This Part proposes a novel application of trade
secret law to resolve these disputes. As this Part argues, trade secret law is
best suited to preserve incentives which benefit the public and to balance
rights between employers and workers.
A. Password as Trade Secret: A Proxy for the Account
At first blush, trade secret law appears unsuited to the problem because
much of the information in a social network account is public.25 2 However,
one piece of information is invariably secret: the means of accessing the
account. As this Part describes, the secret of access qualifies for narrow
trade secret protection and provides a legal basis for asserting a right of
exclusive access to the account itself.
Information must satisfy three requirements to qualify for trade secret
protection. First, it must not be generally known or readily ascertainable to
those who might obtain economic value from its use.25 3 In other words, it
must be secret, at least with regard to potential competitors. Second, the
information must derive independent economic value from being secret.254
Third, the information must be subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its
secrecy.255
The secret of social network account access typically comprises some
combination of login information necessary to enter the account. Often the
login information is a combination of both a username and password, each
of which includes strings of alphanumeric characters.
A confusing aspect of the secret of account access, from the perspective
of trade secret protection, is that this information is not constant. Many trade
secrets are some form of fixed information. A classic example is the formula
for Coca-Cola. 25 6 The information here is constant: a recipe for making
Coca-Cola that has remained the same or similar for many years. 257 In con-
trast, login information for a given account can be changed repeatedly. In-
deed, anyone who knows the login information can generally change it,
thereby locking everyone else out of the account until they learn the new
key. As a result, it does not make sense to think of the secret of access to the
account as simply one specific set of alphanumeric strings or other combina-
tion of information. Rather, the secret of account access must be conceived
of more broadly as the set of information necessary to access the account at
any given time. For convenience, this Article will refer to the secret of ac-
252. See supra Part II.C.
253. UNw7. TRADE SECRF-rs ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985).
257. Id. at 289-91.
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cess to the account as the "password," but the secret itself is whatever com-
bination of information is necessary to access the account at a given time.
Many protected trade secrets are similarly mercurial. A business's stra-
tegic information may sometimes qualify as a trade secret. 258 This informa-
tion changes as the business's strategy changes. Similarly, customer lists,
another form of information sometimes granted trade secret protection,
change as information about the customers changes and customers are
replaced.5 9
1. Secrecy
Regarding the first and last requirements, the requirements of secrecy
and reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, a password to a social network
account is typically not generally known or readily ascertainable to competi-
tors or potential competitors in the field. 260 In most cases, passwords are
difficult to discover and are quickly changed if they do become available.261
Keeping passwords secret from the public and from competitors requires no
great effort. A social network account user generally does so as a matter of
course.
In the context of social network accounts, both employers and workers
have typically made at least reasonable efforts to keep the account password
secret from the public. If the parties dispute over the account, they likely do
so because they both value the account. And if they value the account, they
recognize the importance of maintaining exclusive access. An account that
anyone can access would quickly lose its appeal to followers and therefore
its value as a means of reaching those followers. 262
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, a party might appreciate the need
to keep the password secret from others, but take the password in the belief
that it owned the trade secret. This question, however, merges with the ques-
tion of which party has the right to the account ab initio, which is discussed
in Part III.B.2. In such circumstances, as will be explained, ownership
should be reasonably clear to the parties.
Password-sharing between workers and employers presents more diffi-
culty. As discussed in Part II.D.3, employers must often share the password
with workers, and workers may be compelled to share passwords with their
employers. Either employer or worker may still retain a protectable trade
258. See, e.g., Aetna, Inc. v. Fluegel, No. CV074033345S, 2008 WL 544504, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2008).
259. See Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Vt. 2001) (noting the proposition
that customer lists are often protected as trade secrets).
260. See id.
261. Security mechanisms on website accounts are generally effective at keeping out
those without specific knowledge of the password and username. How to Reduce the
Probabilities of Your Web Site Getting Hacked, CRYIURL (Mar. 1, 2012), http://
www.crypturl.com/how-to-reduce-the-probabilities-of-your-web-site-getting-hacked/.
262. See supra Part II.E.
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secret in the password even if shared with the other party in the employment
relationship. The law imposes a duty on workers to safeguard their em-
ployer's trade secrets. 263 The duty generally only applies, however, when the
employee was on notice that the employer regarded the information as its
trade secret.264 Courts vary in the degree of notice required. Some impose an
exacting duty of notice on employers, requiring that the employer clearly
indicate to the employee that information is confidential. 265 Others have
found that the employee is on notice of the importance of keeping certain
information secret simply by virtue of her experience and knowledge of the
company's operations.266
Conversely, where the trade secret belongs to the worker, similar rules
would appear to apply. 267 The employer has no general equivalent to the
duty of confidence of a worker to the employer, 268 but the general rules re-
garding what constitutes reasonable efforts to protect a trade secret would
seem to apply. The trade secret owner is usually deemed to have made rea-
sonable efforts to keep the information secret where she obtains a confidenti-
ality agreement from the party to whom she discloses the information. 269
Even without a confidentiality agreement, however, the mere fact of disclo-
263. See, e.g., Am. Bldg. Maint. Co. v. ACME Prop. Servs., 515 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[Under New York law,] former employees can be restricted from using
their former employer's trade secrets to advance their own interests, even when they have not
signed an employment agreement limiting their activities."); Premier Lab Supply, Inc. v.
Chemplex Indus. Inc., 10 So. 3d 202, 206 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 2009) (holding lack of a confi-
dentiality agreement with an employee to whom confidential information is disclosed does not
by itself defeat trade secret status for the information because an employee who acquires a
special technique or process in his employment is, as a matter of law, under a duty not to use it
for his own benefit or disclose it to others).
264. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901-03
(Minn. 1983) ("If [an employer] wanted to prevent its employees from [producing similar
products for other companies], it had an obligation to inform its employees that certain infor-
mation was secret."); Ist Am. Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 58 (S.D. 1981).
265. A clear indication, for example, might involve requiring employees to sign confi-
dentiality agreements clearly identifying the trade secrets, by labeling the trade secrets as con-
fidential, and explaining the importance of secrecy to employees. See Electro-Craft, 332
N.W.2d at 903; see also Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Guardian Glass Co., 322 F. Supp. 854,
864-65 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd and remanded, 462 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1972).
266. E.g., Technicon Data Sys. Corp. v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286, 291,
(Del. Ch. 1984) (employee's experience working for former employer made him aware that his
former employer regarded the information at issue as a trade secret).
267. Kinkade v. N.Y. Shipbuilding Corp., 122 A.2d 360, 363 (N.J. 1956) (suggesting in
dicta that employee maintained the secrecy of his trade secret where he made only the disclo-
sure necessary to ascertain whether his employer was interested in the information). The case
law on this issue is sparse.
268. An agent owes the principal a duty not to use confidential information for the
agent's own purposes or to serve a third party. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 01 AGENCY § 8.05
(2006). Although the principal owes the agent a duty to deal fairly and in good faith, this duty
is not typically characterized as a duty of confidentiality. See id. § 8.15.
269. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714 (7th Cir.
2003).
251Spring 2013]
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 19:201
sure to the employer should not necessarily preclude trade secret protection.
For example, at least in some cases where an employer abuses its authority
by demanding access to a trade secret, the employer's demand might qualify
as misappropriation by improper means. 2 70 If the employer misappropriates a
worker's trade secret, the worker not only retains the right to the trade secret
but may be entitled to damages for the employer's actions. 271
2. Independent Economic Value
Second, to qualify for trade secret protection, the information at issue
must derive independent economic value from its secrecy.2 72 The informa-
tion must be not generally known or readily ascertainable to those who could
gain economic value from its disclosure or use.2 73 Many parties would gain
economic benefit from accessing a widely followed account. For example,
the opportunity to access Lady Gaga's fifty million Facebook followers
could be quite valuable. 274 Indeed, widely followed social network account
owners are often paid thousands of dollars to endorse products from their
accounts. 275
The key point for trade secret protection, however, is that the informa-
tion at issue derives independent economic value from being secret. 27 6 This
270. "If a trade secret is acquired through conduct that is itself tortious or criminal inva-
sion of the trade secret owner's rights, the acquisition ordinarily will be regarded as improper."
RiESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPITITION § 43 cmt. c. (1995). Extortionate behavior by
employers could be tortious or criminal. For example, some states have statutes prohibiting
employers from demanding fees or other forms of remuneration in exchange for continuing
employment. E.g., Logan v. Forever Living Prods. Intern., Inc., 52 P.3d 760, 763 (Ariz. 2002).
271. See UNwv. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 3, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). A trade secret owner's
rights are the same whether she is a worker or an employer. However, when a worker creates a
trade secret using the employer's resources, such as the employer's equipment, courts typically
hold that the employer, as a matter of equity, gains a shop right to the trade secret. See, e.g.,
Lariscey v. United States, 949 F.2d 1137, 1143-45 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Kincade, 122 A.2d at
364-65. A shop right is an irrevocable, non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use the trade
secret. Id. at 364-65. As a doctrine based on equitable principles, however, the shop right does
not make sense in the context of the secret of access to a social network account. Kincade, 122
A.2d at 364. A social network account, as discussed in Part I.E, cannot be effectively shared.
The account would lose all of its value. If the employee had the right to the trade secret in the
secret of access to the account, then it would be grossly inequitable to destroy the value in her
right to the social network account by requiring that she share it with her former employer.
Neither side would gain from access to a worthless account and the worker would lose the
value of her trade secret. As Professor Milgrim observed, granting a shop right may not be
appropriate in the context of every trade secret. I MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 201, at
§ 5.02[4][c] ("[Ilt is submitted that the nature of trade secret rights ... must be assessed to
determine if a shop right is appropriate in the trade secret context.").
272. See UNwF. TRADE SEcRErs Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
273. See id.
274. Palis, supra note 8; Brad Stone, A Friend's Tweet Could Be an Ad, N.Y. TIMEiS
(Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/business/22ping.html.
275. Stone, supra note 274.
276. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
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is the case for social network account passwords. If the password is not
secret and anybody could use it to access the account, the password's worth
would decrease because the value of the account would decrease.
As a matter of convention, social network users expect an account to
represent one person-one source.277 Users tend to follow a social network
account because the account becomes a proxy for a person with whom they
feel a sense of connection. 278 As a result, following the account would lose
its appeal if the password was not secret and no single person had control
over the account. Followers would leave.
In addition, the account holder would have to compete with other voices
to gain the followers' attention if others had access to the account. The ac-
count would have significantly less value to the account holder if he or she
no longer had a monopoly on communications from the account. To analo-
gize again to a radio station, a band of frequency would have less worth to a
radio station if it were shared with another radio station. In short, whatever
economic value the password offers the account holder is in large part based
on the fact that it is secret-that the account holder has exclusive access to
this account. Indeed, the account is to a great extent defined by its exclusiv-
ity in that access is limited. The limited access marks it off from other in-
ternet spaces. In that sense, the password, or more broadly, the secret of
access, is an integral part of the account.
The idea of protecting the password as a trade secret may seem counter-
intuitive because the password has no intrinsic value. The password is just
some arbitrary combination of alphanumeric characters which happens to be
secret. How can a right to something of no intrinsic value confer protection
on something of great value, namely, the social network account? Would
providing trade secret protection to passwords metastasize into a means of
granting trade secret protection to any information protected by a password?
If a password offered legal protection to any information to which it re-
stricted access, trade secret protection would become a vast new property
right, superseding the limitations on copyright and patent protection and en-
gulfing the public domain.
Protecting social network account passwords as trade secrets will not
lead to this nightmare scenario. It provides only a narrow and limited form
of protection-simply prohibiting someone else from misappropriating the
secret of exclusive access to the account. 279 All other information in the ac-
count already accessible to the public would remain unprotected by trade
secret law, and all content openly posted in the account would remain availa-
277. See supra Part II.E.
278. See supra Part IC.
279. Assuming that the requirements for trade secret protection were met: that the pass-
word derived independent economic value from not being generally known and readily availa-
ble and so on. See supra discussion accompanying notes 253-255 .
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ble.211 Likewise, the identities and other public information about the people
openly linked to the account would also remain unprotected .2'
Protecting the password as a trade secret would mean only that no one
without a trade secret right in the password could access the account's fol-
lowers through the links from the protected account. The followers, how-
ever, could still be accessed from another account. For example, returning to
the PhoneDog case, if Noah Kravitz held the trade secret right to the pass-
word to his Twitter account, he would have a right of exclusive access to his
account. 282 Effectively, this would mean that he would have an exclusive
right to post messages under his account name-messages that might be
read by other users linked to his account. But trade secret protection would
not give Kravitz an exclusive right to access users linked to his account, just
an exclusive right to access them from his account. Because profiles of fol-
lowers on Twitter are usually public, any other Twitter user could identify
Kravitz's Twitter followers and communicate with them. Another user
would simply lack the efficiency of the automatic links to Kravitz's follow-
ers from Kravitz's account. This other user could build links of her own to
Kravitz's followers; she just could not use the links laboriously built up in
Kravitz's account. In short, trade secret protection for a social network ac-
count password would be a very narrow form of protection. It would only
grant the rights holder exclusive use of links from the account.
Passwords are a relatively novel form of trade secrets, but courts have
already protected them as trade secrets, particularly when the passwords are
for a social network account. The Northern District of California, for exam-
ple, held in TMX Funding, Inc. v. Impero Technologies that the password to
a computer system merited trade secret protection because it was secret and
because it derived economic value from not being readily known. 28 3
280. Of course, content in the account might be protected under some other intellectual
property regime, such as copyright law or trademark law. See supra Part II.
281. In some social network services, the account profiles are secret and the identities of
followers cannot be seen except by the party which controls the account they follow. In those
cases, protecting the exclusive access to the account might protect this information, but only to
the extent it is not available from some other source.
282. See, e.g., Terms & Privacy, PINITREST, http://pinterest.com/about/terms/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2013) ("Except for User Content, the Service itself, all content and other subject
matter included on or within the Service, and all Intellectual Property Rights in or related to
the Service or any such content or other subject matter ('Pinterest Content') are the property of
Pinterest and its licensors."); Terms of Service, TwirrnR, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited
Feb. 20, 2013) ("All right, title, and interest in and to the Services (excluding Content provided
by users) are and will remain the exclusive property of Twitter and its licensors."). The fact
that the social network provider claims a right in the services does not mean that the user
cannot claim a right in an account against another user. Users might have rights relative to
each other subject to the rights of the social network provider.
283. TMX Funding, Inc v. Impero Techs., No. C 10-00202 JF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60260, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2010). The court held that the plaintiff had alleged adequate
evidence for the trade secret claim to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. Although not apparently
the basis for the court's holding, the passwords in TMX appeared to protect other information
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As courts have already recognized in the recent disputes involving so-
cial network accounts, the benefit of access to the account is not access to
the information in the account, such as posted messages and the identity of
followers, because in many social network accounts, this information is
available without the account password. 28 4 Indeed, in the case of many ac-
counts, any member of the public may view the account postings and follow-
ers. 28 5 The benefit of access to the account is the convenience of
communicating through the account (messages will be automatically sent to
the account's followers) and the advantages of cost-effectively interacting
with this community. 2 86
Therefore, the password to a social network account derives indepen-
dent economic value because it is secret. A competitor cannot use the ac-
count to conveniently communicate with the account's followers and instead
must attract followers by developing her own social network account. The
District of Colorado explained the competitive advantage afforded by a se-
cret password to a MySpace account with many followers in Christou v.
Beatport, LLC:
"Given adequate time and effort, [the defendant] could most likely
duplicate or nearly duplicate the list of MySpace friends that [the
plaintiff] had developed. However, this would involve individually
contacting thousands of individuals with friend requests, and it is by
no means clear that all of those individuals would grant [the defen-
dant] permission to contact them. While [the defendant] may be
able to duplicate a near approximation of the list, duplicating it ex-
actly and doing so within a time frame in which the list would still
be useful to him is less likely."287
More recently, the Northern District of California came to a similar con-
clusion in PhoneDog, denying a motion to dismiss and allowing a claim for
trade secret misappropriation in the password to the Twitter account at issue
to continue. 288 Thus, exclusive access to such an account with a secret pass-
word creates an enormous advantage by offering links already available for
that might qualify for trade secret protection, such as product information and marketing plans.
Complaint 1 43, 60-63, TMX Funding, Inc. v. Impero Techs., No. 510CV00202, 2010 WL
1220930 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2010). Passwords to social network accounts may differ due to the
fact that, in many accounts, the password does not protect any other information that would
meet the requirements for trade secret protection. See supra Part II.C.
284. See, e.g., Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1074-77 (D. Colo.
2012).
285. See supra Part II.C.
286. See supra Part L.B (describing how links work).
287. Christou, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
288. See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
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communication instead of requiring the time-consuming and difficult task of
creating them anew.289
3. Remedies
Unlike other legal paradigms, a trade secret claim based on the pass-
word makes it possible for the plaintiff to recover for the loss of access to
the account itself. Trade secret protection would give the account holder the
legal grounds to sue for misappropriation of the password. Misappropriation
of a trade secret occurs when a party acquires a trade secret by improper
means or violates a promise to keep it secret. 290 Essentially, where the owner
of the trade secret has taken adequate measures to maintain the secrecy of
the trade secret, he has a claim for trade secret misappropriation against a
party that has violated a promise to keep the password secret.291
Remedies available to a trade secret owner for misappropriation include
money damages, injunctions, and court orders requiring the defendant to re-
turn the trade secret. 292 A court may enjoin the defendant's use of a trade
secret.293 Perhaps more helpfully, the court would have the power to restore
the plaintiffs access to the account. Section 2(c) of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act gives courts the authority to order the defendant to take "affirm-
ative actions to protect a trade secret." 294 Because a defendant in a dispute
over the password to a social network account is likely to change the pass-
word, thereby locking the plaintiff out of the account, simply enjoining the
defendant from using the password fails to restore access to the plaintiff. The
more effective remedy is a court order requiring that the defendant return the
password to the plaintiff. Section 2(c) is intended in part to give courts the
power to order the return of trade secrets. 295 The commentary to section 2(c)
explains that a court may order "that a misappropriator return the fruits of
misappropriation to an aggrieved person, e.g., the return of stolen blueprints
or the surrender of surreptitious photographs or recordings." 296 An order re-
289. See supra Part II.E.
290. See UNIF. TRADF SECRETS Acr § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985). Misappropriation may
also occur where the defendant knows that the trade secret had been acquired by mistake. See
id.
291. See id. § 1; see also, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342
F.3d 714, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2003).
292. UNIF. TRADE SECRE-rs Acr §§ 2-3.
293. Id. § 2; see, e.g., Lamb Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 975 (9th
Cir. 1991).
294. See UNIF. TRADE SEcRirs Acr § 2(c). Under the common law, courts also some-
times ordered the defendant to return material in which the trade secret was embodied as an
equitable remedy. See I MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 201, at § 15.02[4].
295. See UNw. TRADE SECRETs Acr § 2; see, e.g., Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp. v. Smith, 75
Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 793-94 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 2008) (holding that a court might order the
defendant to return materials to the plaintiff under the California's Uniform Trade Secrets Act
and citing to the commentary to Section 2(c) of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
296. UNIF. TRADE SECRIrrs Acr § 2.
256
A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights
quiring that the defendant relinquish the password to the plaintiff would
likely be the most straightforward form of remedy.
The plaintiff might also recover money for the misappropriation. Mone-
tary recovery for trade secret misappropriation is the greater of the plaintiff's
actual losses or the defendant's actual gains. 297 Because trade secret protec-
tion for a password is narrow, damages would be quite limited.
In considering the plaintiffs actual losses, courts typically focus on the
plaintiffs lost profits due to misappropriation of the trade secret. 298 Calculat-
ing the profits lost by the plaintiff due to the misappropriation of a social
network account would be difficult. First, determining the extent to which a
follower linked to a social network account translates into profits for the
social network account holder is far from an exact science. 299 In some cases,
the plaintiff could point to click-through sales (those sales made to users
who click a link to the sales website posted in the social network account).30o
However, it might not be clear whether the sale was made to a follower or
someone else who happened upon the social network account, thereby mak-
ing it unclear whether the links in the account led to the sale. Furthermore,
many sales might not be captured by click-through data.
Second, the plaintiff's losses for misappropriation of the password
would have to be measured against the information she could access in the
account even without the password. For example, in Eagle v. Morgan, even
after Eagle's former employer locked her out of the Linkedln account at
issue, Eagle could still find her contacts."' Her loss was only the loss of
convenience of automatic connections to her contacts from the account. 302 In
some cases, this loss of convenience might be quite significant. In
PhoneDog, for example, PhoneDog lost direct and immediate access to
17,000 people who were likely interested in the products their advertisers
offered.0 3 As the court observed in Christou, duplicating links to followers
297. Id. § 3(a); Ri-srArEMENr (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETlTION § 45 (1995).
298. See, e.g., Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1016 (8th
Cir. 2001). Contra Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1120-22, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (including price erosion as a measure of damages).
299. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 36, at 145-48.
300. ZIMMERMAN & SAHLIN, supra note 219, at 681-99; Chris O'Brien, Charlie Sheen
Offers Lessons to Silicon Valley. Yes, Really, MERCURY Niws (Mar. 8, 2011), http://
www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_ 17568271.
301. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *14 (E.D. Pa. 2013) ("Al-
though the Court is aware of the hardship in Plaintiffs efforts to prove who attempted to
contact her during this time period when no records were maintained, the Court nonetheless
notes that any reasonable person seeking Dr. Eagle and aware of her self-proclaimed prompt
responsiveness would have sought out other ways to reach her or, at a minimum, informed her
that they had tried to reach her.").
302. Id.
303. See First Amended Complaint 1 11, 12, 19-22, Phonedog, LLC v. Kravitz, No.
3:1 1-cv-03474, 2011 WL 6955632 (Nov. 29, 2011). Of course, Kravitz would likely argue that
PhoneDog never had real access to these people because he maintained control over the ac-
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would likely take considerable time and effort.3 1 However, the cost in time
and effort of building the account cannot be the measure of the plaintiff's
lost profits because costs must be compared against revenues in calculating
lost profits.3 0 Calculating the defendant's actual gains would involve similar
challenges. 306 In theory, however, a court could calculate the amount of
money required to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of access to the so-
cial network account.
Protecting the social network account password as a trade secret would
be only a very narrow and limited form of protection, but it would fill the
gap left by other legal paradigms. Privacy, publicity, trademark, and copy-
right law do not protect the links to the account. Yet, at the heart of disputes
over social network accounts are conflicting claims to exclusive access to
links built up in the account. Trade secret protection for the password would
protect precisely this exclusive access to these links. 07 Trade secret law
count. Noah Kravitz's Counterclaims and Answer To Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for
Misappropriation Of Trade Secrets, Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage and
Conversion $ 18, Phonedog, 2012 WL 554034 (Feb. 14, 2012). However, in theory, at least, a
company might lose such direct access if an employee took a social network account that it
had used to communicate with followers.
304. Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10-cv-02912-RBJ-KMT, 2012 WL 872574, at *16
(D. Colo. Mar. 14, 2012).
305. See, e.g., Healthcare Advocates v. Affordable Healthcare Options, No. 09-5839,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122365, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2010).
306. See UNW. TRADE SEcurrs Acr § 3(a), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
307. A plaintiff might claim that a defendant's action in taking a social network account
password violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"). 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2011).
Potential claims might include a claim under Section 1030(a)(2)(C) that the defendant inten-
tionally accessed a computer without authorization and thereby obtained information from the
protected computer or a claim under Section 1030(a)(5)(C) that the defendant intentionally
accessed a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, caused
damage and loss. Eagle v. Morgan, No. I1-4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4,
2012). However, civil claims under the CFAA must show "damage or loss." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(g). Some courts have interpreted this damage or loss requirement quite strictly, requir-
ing that the plaintiff show that his losses stem from some impairment of the computer system.
E.g., Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *5; Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, Inc., No. 6:04-CV-
13740RL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743, at *5 n.5 (M.D. Ha. 2005); Moulton v. VC3, No.
1:00CV434-TWT, 2000 WL 33310901, at *6 (N.D. Ga. 2000). The plaintiff would be unlikely
to show that the computer system has been impaired by the loss a social network account.
Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *5. However, a claim under the CFAA might be more successful
in the Ninth Circuit, where courts construe "damage or loss" more liberally. Therapeutic Res.
Faculty v. NBTY, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995-97 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a claim
could be stated under the CFAA against a party that exceeded authorized use of password and
thereby obtained additional access to licensed materials). In any case, the CFAA does not
provide a means of determining which party has the right to the social network account ab
initio and therefore which party's access is unauthorized. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. In disputes over
social network accounts in the employment context, a critical issue is which party holds rights
to an account created during the course of employment. Trade secret law is a better approach
for resolving disputes over social network accounts because, as explained in the next part, it
provides a framework for allocating rights in a trade secret account ab initio.
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therefore provides a legal means to protect what is of most value in the
account.
B. Trade Secret Law: The Best Framework to Promote Incentives
Trade secret law not only offers a legal mechanism to regain access to
the account, but is also the best fit for the problem of allocating and protect-
ing rights in a social network account. The right solution to disputes over
social network accounts will provide incentives for the development of use-
ful information. Trade secret law is driven in large part by this same policy
concern. The rationale for trade secret protection therefore aligns with the
rationale for protecting rights to an account. Furthermore, trade secret law's
framework for providing incentives fits the problem of disputes over social
network accounts.
1. Preserving Incentives to Produce Valuable Information
The trade secret framework preserves incentives to produce valuable in-
formation by protecting that information from misappropriation.3 0s Trade se-
cret law would operate the same way in the context of social network
platforms. By protecting the social network account from misappropriation,
trade secret law would provide an incentive for the development of valuable
information. In a social network account, the links to the account roughly
represent the value of the information, both to the public and to the account
holder. With regard to the public, the fact that members of the public choose
to follow an account suggests that the information provided in the account
has worth to them. The number of links to an account may therefore roughly
correspond to the usefulness to the public of the information provided.3 09
The links also have worth to the account holder by providing an audience
and a means to obtain feedback.
Moreover, providing trade secret protection encourages organizations to
leverage the talents of their workers and encourages workers to sell their
labor by giving each party recourse against the other for misappropriation of
the social network account. Thus, protecting the account from misappropria-
308. This is the property rationale for trade secret protection. See RiESTATEMENT (THIRD)
UNFAIR CoMPrrrIoN § 39 cmt. a (1995). A competing rationale for the legal protection of
trade secrets is the discouragement of unfair competition by creating a tort for the wrongful
appropriation of competitive information. See id. As Judge Posner has argued, however, the
property and tort rationales are complementary not contradictory. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc.
v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1991). The aim of both rationales is to
discourage individuals from engaging in activities that merely redistribute wealth rather than
creating wealth. Id.
309. In fact, due to the amplifying effect of the social networks in social media, the
benefits of information provided in the account goes beyond the value to the people connected
to the account. Those in the network of a person connected to an account benefit from infor-
mation passed on to them. The public also benefits from the continual feedback provided to
companies through the conversation that social media fosters. See supra Part II.D.I.
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tion encourages organizations and individuals to provide information of
value to the public.
The paradoxical effect of trade secret protection is that protection of
trade secrets encourages confidential disclosure-to the benefit of the pub-
lic.31() Without protection, trade secret owners would hesitate to disclose
their trade secrets, even for the purpose of engaging in useful transactions." I
Protection despite disclosure is crucial to many forms of transactions, partic-
ularly for interactions between employers and workers. For instance, assured
of legal protection, employers disclose their trade secrets to workers in order
that the workers may use them on the employer's behalf.3 12 The public then
benefits from the production of goods and services made possible by these
trade secrets."'
Perhaps more importantly, trade secret law properly allocates rights in
the account ab initio. The particular challenge in disputes over social net-
work accounts is that they cannot be resolved by reference to a preexisting
right. Unlike disputes over domain names, a social network account is not
tied to a trademark in the way that a domain name is tied to a preexisting
trademark.314 Whatever value there is in an account is created when the links
in the account are generated. Therefore, resolving a dispute over rights to a
social network account requires determining which party had the rights to
the links at creation. Moreover, the solution must allocate rights in a way
that best sets incentives to create and invest in these accounts.
As described in Parts I and II, the benefits of organizations' participa-
tion in social network platforms are enhanced when employers use their
workers to engage with the public in a personal manner. At the same time,
the public benefits when workers have an incentive to use social networking
to enhance their skills. Consequently, the solution to disputes over social
network accounts should provide incentives to both employers and workers
to invest in social network accounts without punishing blended personal and
professional use.
2. Rights to a Trade Secret Developed During Employment
Trade secret law has a well-established set of principles for optimizing
incentives to create in the employment context. First, rights to a trade secret
vest in the party that developed the trade secret information. 1 5 By granting
310. Mark Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 332-37 (2008).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 335.
314. See supra Part II.A.
315. RESTATEMENi (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEffTION § 42 cmt. e (1995); Wireless Spe-
cialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 131 N.E. 307, 308 (Mass. 1921); MIL-RIM &
BENSEN, supra note 201, at § 5.02[4]; see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 885
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rights to the creator, trade secret law encourages the development of useful
information by encouraging the work at its source. 1 6
This default rule can be modified by the "hired-to-invent" doctrine.
Even in the absence of an express agreement, where the worker develops the
information on behalf of the employer, the rights to the trade secret belong
to the employer. 1 7 Under the hired-to-invent doctrine, courts determine
whether the employer or worker possesses the right to a trade secret devel-
oped during the course of the employment based on an implied-in-fact
agreement between the parties.318 The case law regarding the hired-to-invent
doctrine is more developed in the context of patents, but the underlying prin-
ciple is the same. 19 The employer obtains the rights to inventions which it
hired the employee to invent, whether the invention results in a trade secret
or a patent.3 211
The hired-to-invent doctrine uses contract principles to optimize incen-
tives for both employer and worker.3 21 When the employer hires the worker
to create a specific invention, the worker effectively bargains for and re-
ceives compensation for his creation in the form of his pay.3 22 Assuming low
transaction costs and competitive markets, contracts optimize benefits for
both parties and the public. 3 23 The worker obtains the greatest available com-
pensation for his creative labor, and the employer obtains the creative work
at the lowest possible cost. 324 In turn, the public enjoys the benefits of the
trade secret at minimal cost. 325
(N.J. 1988) ("The common law regards an invention as the property of the inventor who con-
ceived, developed, and perfected it.").
316. See American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 97 N.E. 911, 912 (Mass. 1912); Wexler v.
Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433-34 (Pa. 1960).
317. RusTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. e. The law on this sub-
ject is virtually identical in every state. Mary Lafrance, Nevada's Employee Inventions Statute:
Novel, Nonobvious, and Patently Wrong, 3 Niv. L.J. 88, 91 (2002).
318. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
319. 1 MILGRIM & BENSmN, supra note 201, at § 5.02[4]; see, e.g., McClain v. State, 269
S.W.3d 191, 198 (Tex. App. 2008). Logically, the rules for the hired-to-invent doctrine should
be the same for patent law and trade secret law because the same invention might qualify for
both trade secret protection and meet the requirements for patentability. I MILGRIM & BENSIN,
supra note 201, at § 8.02[l].
320. See Wireless Specialty Apparatus, 131 N.E. at 308 (applying the same reasoning
under the hired-to-invent doctrine to both trade secrets and patents).
321. As the Federal Circuit observed, the hired-to-invent doctrine is grounded "in the
principles of contract law that allow parties to freely structure their transactions and obtain the
benefit of any bargains reached." Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
322. Michael 1. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Primer on the Coase Theorem:
Making Law in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, II DIPAut Bus. L.J. 1, 9-11 (1998)
(explaining how contracts optimize benefits in conditions of low transaction costs and compet-
itive markets).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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Therefore, to overcome the default rule that rights to a trade secret vest
in the creator, the employer must show that the parties in fact agreed that the
rights would instead vest in the employer.3 26 Specifically, the employer is
required to show that there was a true "meeting of the minds" or "tacit un-
derstanding." 32 To fall under this implied agreement, the trade secret must
arise out of the duties assigned to the employee. 328 Thus, where the em-
ployee was directed to create specific information for the employer, any
trade secret resulting from that work belongs to the employer. 32 9 Where the
employee is hired in a general inventive capacity, however, whether the em-
ployee's work belongs to the employer depends on a number of factors such
as how closely related the information was to the employer's business, the
amount of resources assigned to this task, and whether workers have as-
signed inventions to the employer in the past. 330 The analysis seeks to deter-
mine whether the employer made the terms of its offer clear.331 A reasonable
person in the worker's shoes should understand that the employer has of-
fered to pay the worker in exchange for obtaining the rights to the informa-
tion the worker has created.332 The worker must agree to this offer, even if
tacitly. 33
326. Banks, 228 F.3d at 1359.
327. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting
Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923).
328. Courts demand more specific instructions where the trade secret is a true invention
in the sense that it would qualify for patent protection. A patentable invention is inherently
unique and unpredictable due to the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. Therefore,
the employer must show that the invention resulted from specific instructions instead of being
conceived as a merely fortuitous by-product of the worker's job. See United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933) ("The reluctance of courts to imply or infer an
agreement by the employee to assign his patent is due to a recognition of the peculiar nature of
the act of invention . . . ."). Where the information is a compilation of information, the stan-
dard appears to be more relaxed: the trade secret should arise out of the duties to which the
employee was assigned. See REjSTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPErITfON § 42 cmt. e (1995);
see, e.g., N. Elec. Co., Inc. v. Torma, 819 N.E.2d. 417 (Ind. App. 2004).
329. See, e.g., Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 419 A.2d 1115, 1117 (N.H. 1980) ("The prod-
uct of one who is hired to invent, accomplish a prescribed result, or aid in the development of
products belongs to the employer in the absence of a written contract to assign."); Kinkade v.
N.Y. Shipbuilding Corp., 122 A.2d 360, 369 (N.J. 1956); Nat'l Dev. Co. v. Gray, 55 N.E.2d
783, 787 (Mass. 1944).
330. Thomas F. Cotter, Conflicting Interests in Trade Secrets, 48 FLA. L. RIEv. 591, 594
(1996); 8 DoNALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTs § 22.03[2] (2012) (listing factors for the
hired-to-invent doctrine in cases of patentable inventions).
331. See Nat'l Dev. Co., 55 N.E.2d at 786-87 (noting that a hired-to-invent agreement
only exists where "the contract, construed in the light of the attending circumstances, shows
that the employee must have reasonably understood that such inventions as resulted from his
performance of the contract should belong to the employer").
332. See id.
333. See Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("An
implied-in-fact contract is an agreement 'founded upon a meeting of the minds, which, al-
though not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact from conduct of the parties
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This agreement may take place at any time during the course of employ-
ment. In this sense, the term hired to invent is misleading because the parties
may agree that the employee will invent on behalf of the employer long after
the employee is hired. 334 The implied-in-fact agreement in place at the time
of the invention governs the rights to the invention. 35
3. Applying the Trade Secret Approach
The trade secret approach applies in a straightforward fashion to opti-
mize the incentives of the employer and worker to invest in social network-
ing. First, the party that does the work of creating the account should, by
default, have the rights to the account. 36 Creating the account should not be
defined as merely the trivial work of opening the account, however, but as
the substantial investment of time and energy needed to develop the links in
the account. The links to the account are an integral part of the account and
give it value.
Second, where the parties have agreed, even impliedly, that the worker
created the account in exchange for his salary or other compensation, the
employer should have the rights to the account. Again, allocating rights
based on contract principles optimizes incentives to invest in social network
accounts. In a free market, the worker bargains for the highest compensation
for his labor in developing a following for the social network account. The
employer bargains for access to the account at the lowest cost. And the pub-
lic benefits from the creation of the account at the lower cost.
Trade secret law recognizes two competing policy concerns in em-
ployer-worker disputes over rights to material developed during the course
of employment. On the one hand, allowing the parties the freedom to bar-
gain enables each to optimize their benefits through contract.337 On the other
hand, granting the employer rights in a worker's skills and information
showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding."' (quoting
Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923))).
334. Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'g Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1961) (employer is
entitled to inventions of an employee who, although not initially hired to invent, was later
assigned to use his inventive talents on behalf of the employer); Houghton v. United States, 23
F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1928) ("It matters not in what capacity the employee may originally
have been hired, if he be set to experimenting with the view of making an invention . . . what
he accomplishes by the experiments belongs to the employer.").
335. Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Sunas, 437 S.E.2d 674, 679-80 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
336. R-STATEMIENr (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. e (1995); MItGRIM &
BENSEN, supra note 201, at § 5.02[4]; see, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879,
885 (N.J. 1988) ("The common law regards an invention as the property of the inventor who
conceived, developed, and perfected it."); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Con-
denser Co., 131 N.E. 307, 308 (Mass. 1921).
337. See Swygert & Yanes, supra note 322, at 9-11.
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harms the worker by decreasing his ability to earn a livelihood.338 The public
interest in open competition in turn suffers when workers are prevented from
competing with former employers.339 Granting the employer a right to such
skills and information, either by contract or through trade secret protection,
discourages an employee from leaving because she cannot make a living
outside the company. 34() As a result, employers do not compete for the best
employees either through retention or hiring.34' The worker then has no in-
centive to improve her skills because she will not be compensated for her
investment in enhanced skills through competition among employers. 342 A
number of undesirable consequences result, including decreases in innova-
tion, worker mobility and economic growth. 343
Trade secret law attempts to resolve this tension by carving out the
skills, experience, and knowledge necessary to a worker to make a living in
her chosen profession from trade secret protection and from noncompete
agreements. 3" Therefore, trade secret law does not give the employer a right
to a worker's skill or knowledge, even when such skill or knowledge is
acquired during the employment. 345 Nor may the employer contractually re-
strict a departing worker from using his skills or knowledge to the extent that
338. See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1960) (noting that preventing a
worker from using his skills for another employer may restrain the worker from pursuing his
livelihood).
339. See id. (noting that preventing a worker from using his skills for another employer
may harm "the public in general in forestalling, to any extent widespread technological
advances").
340. Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of
Technical Professionals, 76 AM. Soc. REv. 695 (2011).
341. Fisk & Barry, supra note 226 (manuscript at 33).
342. Id. at 27 ("[E]mployees in strict enforcement jurisdictions will be discouraged from
investing in their human capital because they know that they will not be able to solicit employ-
ment offers from outside firms that they could either accept or use as leverage to negotiate an
increase in their salary at their current employer.").
343. Id. at 26, 28-30, 35 (describing Fisk & Barry's argument that restraints on employ-
ees' ability to compete depresses innovation by impeding the cross-pollination of skills and
ideas between organizations, hampers the creation of new firms and entrepreneurial activity,
and increases employer search costs).
344. See Robert Unikel, Bridging the Trade Secret Gap: Protecting "Confidential Infor-
mation" Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 867-75 (1998)
(describing the current two-tiered approach, in which an employee's knowledge is classified
either as general and thus not subject to judicial protection, or as a trade secret and entitled to
judicial protection).
345. Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Iowa 1977) ("One rather sali-
ent point runs steadfastly throughout decisions in this area in most jurisdictions, and that is that
the employee, upon terminating his employment relationship with his employer, is entitled to
take with him 'the experience, knowledge, memory, and skill, which he had gained while there
employed."); RESTATMEr (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995) ("The dis-
tinction between trade secrets and general skill, knowledge, training, and experience is in-
tended to achieve a reasonable balance between the protection of confidential information and
the mobility of employees.").
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the agreement unreasonably restricts the worker's ability to make a living.4 6
Indeed, a growing chorus of commentators argues that all types of noncom-
pete agreements harm the public interest and should not be enforced. 347
The same concerns arise in the context of rights to social network ac-
counts. Workers use their social network accounts to develop skills and
knowledge and to build a network which enables them to continue develop-
ing skills and knowledge. A worker might, for example, use her social net-
work account to hone her communication skills, build a personal brand,
learn about news and opportunities specific to her industry, and build a per-
sonal and professional network. 348 Allowing the employer to prevent a
worker from using her skills and knowledge when she leaves her employer
without compensation would decrease the worker's incentive to invest in
herself through social networking. Nevertheless, a distinction can be made
between the social network account and the worker's collective abilities. The
account is only the consequence of a worker's skill and experience in her
chosen field, not the worker's skill or experience itself. With regard to the
worker's network, the social network account is likewise only a virtual rep-
resentation of links to people rather than the network itself.
Therefore, a worker's agreement to transfer rights in the social network
account to the employer would not necessarily harm the worker's interest or
the public interest. Where the worker freely bargains away the social net-
work account in exchange for its market value, the worker will have re-
ceived optimal compensation for her labor and skill. 4 9 Such an agreement
does not prevent the worker from making a living in her chosen profession.
She may still use her expertise. Moreover, her personal brand is still hers
because she retains the right to her identity. Thus, the worker could enjoin
the employer from continuing to use her name or even a username associ-
ated with her without permission based on a trademark, right of publicity, or
misappropriation of identity theory."o The worker can open new accounts to
recreate the electronic links with her network and, to the extent former fol-
lowers followed her personally, they might be persuaded to follow her again.
Of course, recreating the links to former followers would take an investment
346. RESTATEM ENT (S EcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g (1981) (explaining that states
vary widely in their interpretations of reasonableness and some states do not enforce noncom-
pete contracts at all); see Viva Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 939 (2012).
347. See Moffat, supra note 346; Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced? New
Empirical Evidence Reveals the Economic Harm of Non-compete Covenants, REG., Winter
2010-2011, at 6; see also Fisk & Barry, supra note 226 (manuscript at 35). Not all states
enforce noncompete agreements. In California, for example, noncompete agreements are pro-
hibited. CAL. Bus. & PROF. Cool § 16600 (West 2010).
348. See supra Part LA, specifically text accompanying notes 92-102.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 289-292.
350. See supra Part II.A.
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of time and effort. But in a fair bargain, the employer will have compensated
her for the work required to recreate the electronic links to her network.
Nevertheless, the employer should bear a heavy burden to prove that the
worker in fact agreed not only to ensure that both parties had a true opportu-
nity to bargain for the best deal, but also to avoid the harms caused by de-
creasing the worker's incentive to invest in her own skills and knowledge. A
worker may make less effort to build a social network online and to develop
a personal brand if she believes that her employer may take away her social
network account without compensation. As a result, she may forego oppor-
tunities to learn more about her industry, hone her communication skills,
meet other professionals, and, in general, improve her expertise and
knowledge.
As in the trade secret context, the challenge in applying this analysis is
determining the nature of the agreement. The distinctions are subtle. The fact
that the worker used the trade secret (access to a social network account) on
the employer's behalf does not end the analysis. 35' The parties must agree
not only that the worker will use the trade secret on the employer's behalf,
but that the employer will obtain the rights to the trade secret.35 2 Thus, in the
context of social network platforms, the fact that a worker agreed to use her
social network account to benefit the employer (for example, by linking to
the employer's web site in the PhoneDog case) does not necessarily imply
that the parties agreed that the account itself belongs to the employer. As in
the trade secret context, a court must carefully scrutinize the circumstances
and the objective manifestations of each party to determine the nature of the
agreement. 3 3
The inquiry and factors used in trade secret cases provide useful tools
for analyzing the facts in a given case. 354 The first challenge in analyzing the
terms of any implied agreement between employer and worker is to deter-
mine the nature of the employer's offer. The relatively easy case is one in
which the employer gives specific instructions to create social network ac-
351. See, e.g., Structural Dynamics Res. Corp. v. Eng'g Mech. Res. Corp., 401 F. Supp.
1102, 1112 (D. Mich. 1975) (finding that an employer did not have a trade right to its former
workers' invention although the workers created it during the time of their employment and
used it on behalf of their former employer).
352. The mere fact that the worker creates something of use to the employer does not
mean that the employer has rights to that invention. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COM-
IFIarrIoN § 42 cmt. e (1995) ("[Ihf one is employed merely to do work in a particular line in
which he is an expert, there is no inference that inventions which he makes while so working
belong to the employer.").
353. See Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see
also Richard A. Lord, Requirements for Informal Contracts, in I WILusToN ON CONTRACrs
§ 3:2 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that a binding mutual agreement may be implied from the parties'
conduct and the surrounding circumstances where the parties manifest objectively an intent to
be bound by the agreement).
354. Thomas F. Cotter, supra note 330, at 594; 8 CHISUM, supra note 330, § 22.03[2]
(listing factors for the hired-to-invent doctrine in cases of patentable inventions).
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counts for the employer's use. Where the employer gives the worker more
general instructions, a court might look to the factors outlined above-cus-
tom, relation to the employer's business, and the employer's dedication of
resources to the task-to determine whether the employer made clear its
expectation that the worker create a social network account for the employer
in exchange for compensation.
Regarding custom, the fact that workers for a particular employer rou-
tinely gave the employer access to their accounts upon leaving would be
indicative of the parties' understanding. An employer's dedication of re-
sources to help workers develop social network accounts, such as guidance,
training, and evaluation, would also indicate agreement.
The nature of the content in the account also indicates the purpose for
which the account is created and developed. Courts, however, should be cau-
tious in drawing conclusions solely based on the account's content. Again,
professional and personal content blur on social network platforms. An indi-
vidual may post professional content for personal reasons, such as to build
skills and a professional network. Conversely, an individual may post per-
sonal content on behalf of the employer to attract an audience for the em-
ployer's website. A court should not conclude that a worker created an
account on behalf of the employer solely because the worker posted content
related to his profession.
To determine whether the worker agreed to the employer's implied of-
fer, the court must evaluate the objective manifestations of the worker.'-"
The worker's agreement might be manifested through his words.5 6 For ex-
ample, in Morris v. Scenera Research, the court construed the worker's ref-
erence to himself as the "chief inventor" and his statement that his
employment goal was to develop new inventions as indicating that he under-
stood that his inventions would belong to his employer.35 7 Similarly, in the
social network context, a worker's reference to herself as "social networking
director" and a statement that her goal is to develop a social network account
for her employer might indicate an understanding that she had built the so-
cial network account for her employer to keep. In a case where the employer
made the terms quite clear, the employee's agreement might simply be
gleaned from her decision to stay at the job and perform by creating the
social network account.35 8
355. See Teets, 83 F.3d at 407; see also Lord, supra note 353, at § 3:2.
356. Morris v. Scenera Research, No. 09 CVS 19678, 2012 WL 70347, at *5, [ 25 (N.C.
Super. 2012).
357. Id.
358. Whether the worker adequately manifests agreement by simply continuing to work
when the employer imposes an additional obligation after the initial hiring is a difficult ques-
tion. As the Michigan Supreme Court observed in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co. (In re
Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989), the characterization of employment as a
series of one-day unilateral contracts is "strikingly artificial." Id. at 116 (holding that employer
may unilaterally change written discharge-for-cause policy to employment-at-will policy, but,
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A number of other factors specific to the social network account context
would help to determine the intentions of the parties: the name of the ac-
count, exclusivity of access, the type of account, and whether the account
preexists the employment relationship. First, the name of the account pro-
vides an important clue. Where the account is named after the employer, the
name suggests that the parties intended that the employer would have a right
to the account. Similarly, an account named after the worker suggests that
the parties understood that the worker would retain exclusive right of access.
Of course, the harder cases are those like the PhoneDog case where the
name of the account combined both the name of the employer and the
worker, like @PhoneDogNoah.5 9
With regard to the exclusivity of access, the fact that several workers
had access to and worked on one account would suggest that the parties did
not contemplate that any one worker had an exclusive right to the account.
Conversely, the fact that only one worker ever accessed the account would
be evidence in support of that worker's exclusive right to the account. The
type of account might also indicate the parties' intentions. For example, on
Facebook, a user's "personal timeline" must only represent individuals, at
least according to Facebook's instructions.3 60 However, "Facebook Pages"
may represent an organization, business, or celebrity.3 61 The fact that a
worker chose to create a "personal timeline" on Facebook as opposed to a
"Facebook Page," or some other form of social network account, might indi-
cate that the parties intended that the account would belong to the worker.
Finally, the fact that an account preexists the employment relationship obvi-
ates the need to analyze ownership under the work-made-for-hire doctrine.
The worker was clearly not hired to invent if she created the account before
she was hired. 362
to be effective, the affected employees must receive reasonable notice of the change). "Few
employers and employee begin each day contemplating whether to renew or modify the em-
ployment contract in effect at the close of work on the previous day." Id. at 116. For example,
in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Sunas, 437 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. App. 1993), the court held that a policy
unilaterally implemented by the employer that employee inventions belong to the employer
years after the employee was hired did not become incorporated into the employment agree-
ment. Id. at 678-79. However, the court held in the same case that the employer's instruction
to the employee to create a particular invention could form the basis of an agreement to assign
the invention to the employer if the employee created the invention after the instruction. Id. at
679-80.
359. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2011).
360. How Are Pages Different from Personal Timelines?, FACEBOOK, http://www.face
book.com/help/217671661585622/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
361. See id.
362. The parties could still agree to transfer the account between them. In that case,
again, a court would have to evaluate the nature of the agreement between the parties.
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In short, these factors might help ascertain the parties' intentions. How-
ever, in each case, a court would have to carefully evaluate all the circum-
stances to determine the nature of the parties' "tacit understanding."3 63
To conclude, trade secret law offers a flexible and appropriate set of
rules for allocating the right of exclusive access to a social network account
between employers and workers. Trade secret law not only provides the best
framework for optimizing incentives to create valuable information and in-
vest in workers, but trade secret analysis can also be applied directly to dis-
putes over social network accounts to achieve the right outcome.
C. Trade Secrets in Conjunction with Other Legal Concerns
Trade secret analysis will also lead to a just outcome for legal claims
arising under other legal paradigms. In many cases, the question of access to
the account can be separated from the issue of legal rights in the content of
the account. The outcome of the trade secret analysis in these cases will have
no bearing on the outcome of other legal claims. Where access to the ac-
count implicates other rights, however, the trade secret resolution to the ac-
cess question will generally not conflict with the resolution of other legal
claims related to the account.
1. Trademark and Personality Rights
In general, trademark and personality rights claims may be resolved in-
dependently from the issue of access to the account.3 * Where trademarks or
signifiers of identity are used confusingly in an account, they may often be
deleted or changed. 65 If the trademark holder has lingering concerns about
confusion, a court might require the account holder to post disclaimers dis-
avowing any connection to the trademark's owner.
That is not to say that the issue of rights in an account and the issue of
rights in the name of the account have no relation to each other. As de-
scribed in Part III.B.2, the name of the account should be a factor in the
hired-to-invent analysis. For example, when a Coca-Cola employee creates a
Facebook page named "Coca-Cola," the name strongly suggests that the par-
ties agreed that the page would belong to Coca-Cola. 66 In most cases, as a
result, the trade secret approach would award access to the account to the
party that owned the rights to the trademark or persona in the name of the
account.
363. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
364. See supra Part L.A.
365. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
366. The situations where the account is named after both parties will be the hard cases.
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2. Privacy and Trade Secrets
To the extent that an account contains trade secrets in addition to the
password,36 7 the analysis regarding the rights to those trade secrets would
parallel the analysis regarding the right to access the account. Thus, which-
ever party had the right to access the account would, in most cases, also have
the right to the trade secrets in the account. If the outcomes conflicted, a
court might simply order the party that loses the account to delete the secret
information before turning over the password.16 1 Privacy concerns can be
resolved similarly.
Moreover, like trademarks and personality rights, the existence of pri-
vate information may help to resolve the hired-to-invent question by indicat-
ing the expectations of the parties. The fact that a worker posted highly
private information in the account may indicate that the worker did not fore-
see and therefore did not agree to turn the account over to the employer.
Similarly, the trade secret analysis may help to resolve the privacy question.
Where the parties clearly agreed that the employer would take the account, a
court might reasonably conclude that the worker did not consider the infor-
mation in the account to be private.
The expectations of the followers linked to the account raise a more
difficult privacy problem. Where the account is only visible to a small circle,
such as friends and family, followers of that account might reasonably ex-
pect that information sent to that account or visible from that account would
remain out of public view.369 Simply as a matter of public policy, social
network users should be able to proceed with some confidence that their
private information will not be turned over to others as accounts change
hands.370 Although the followers may not be party to a suit over rights to a
social network account, the plaintiff in most cases will request that the court
enjoin the defendant from using the account and, in considering whether to
grant an injunction, the court must consider the public interest as a factor in
the decision. 37 1 This consideration of the public interest should include an
367. A set of customers linked to the account might qualify as trade secrets where the
customers linked to the account were not publicly visible. Similarly, information communi-
cated to those customers through the account, such as pricing or order details, could merit
trade secret protection to the extent the information remained secret. See supra note 203.
368. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
369. See James Grimmelmann, supra note 199, at 1164-66 (giving examples of expecta-
tions of privacy on Facebook).
370. Id. at 1195-97 (arguing that the privacy expectations of social network users should
be respected).
371. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) ("According to
well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must . . .
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.").
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analysis of the interests of the followers. On privacy grounds, a court should
hesitate to turn over an account unless the followers could have reasonably
expected that the employer would have access to the information.
However, the factors for determining the reasonable expectations of the
followers will significantly overlap with the factors in determining whether
the account belongs to the employer under a hired-to-invent analysis. Where
the worker is clearly acting on behalf of the employer-for example, by
naming the account at least in part after the employer, advertising the em-
ployer's products, or frequently posting links to the employer's website-a
follower should reasonably expect that the employer would have access to
anything that follower decided to share with the account. Thus, in the main,
privacy concerns will not be in tension with the proposed trade secret resolu-
tion of disputes over rights to the account.
3. Copyright
Finally, the trade secret approach would be unlikely to conflict with
concerns regarding the display of content under copyright law. 72 With re-
spect to copyright law, the analysis used to determine which party has the
rights to new copyrightable material in the account is quite similar to the
analysis to determine which party has the right to access the account itself,
and thus is likely to lead to the same outcome. The rules regarding owner-
ship of copyrightable works in the employment context closely parallel the
rules in the trade secret context. As in trade secret law, copyright vests in the
creator of the work by default. 7 In the trade secret context, this default rule
is modified by the hired-to-invent doctrine, in which the employer obtains
the rights to trade secrets that the employee was hired to create. Copyright
law has a similar doctrine called "work made for hire."37 4 Where the copy-
righted work is created as a work made for hire during the course of employ-
ment, the rights vest in the employer.75
The chief difference between the trade secret and copyright analysis is
that, unlike the hired-to-invent doctrine in patent law, which is based in prin-
ciples of contract law, the work-made-for-hire rule is based in principles of
agency law.37 6 The copyright in a worker's work belongs to the employer
when the worker is an employee and the work is created during the scope of
372. See supra Part II.B.
373. 17 U.S.C. § 20 1(a) (2011); Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 885 (N.J.
1988) (providing support for trade secret law proposition).
374. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1); RESTATrMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEffTION § 42 cmt.
e (1195).
375. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1).
376. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51 (1989). Some
types of copyrightable works, such as compilations, only qualify as works made for hire when
the parties sign an express contract. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). If a social network account were
considered one of the works subject to this rule, then the employer would only have copyright
rights in the account content if the parties signed an agreement to that effect. See id.
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employment.7 7 Both the question of whether a worker is an independent
contractor and whether the work was prepared during the scope of employ-
ment are determined in light of the common law of agency.378 Where the
worker is an employee, the outcome of the analysis of work made for hire is
likely to be the same as the outcome of a hired-to-invent analysis because
the inquiry in both is essentially whether the worker consented to do the
work on behalf of the employer, based on the objective manifestations of the
parties.379
The factors courts consider are quite similar in each analysis. Again, to
determine whether a worker is hired to invent a trade secret, a court would
consider whether the worker was directed to create specific information for
the employer.3 11o In a situation without a specific instruction, the court exam-
ines factors such as how closely related the information was to the em-
ployer's business, the amount of resources assigned to this task, and whether
workers have assigned inventions to the employer in the past."' Similarly, a
court seeking to determine whether a copyrightable work is a work made for
hire would consider whether "(a) [the work] is of the kind [the servant] is
employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time
and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the master."38 2 As a result, the circumstances that would indicate that
the worker had impliedly agreed to leave the social network account to the
employer would also likely be circumstances suggesting that the copyright-
able content in the account was a work made for hire.
Even where the ownership of the copyright in the content and the own-
ership of the account differ, copyright law will most likely not be a barrier to
377. See id. § 101(1). A work is also a work made for hire if the parties sign a written
agreement to that effect and the copyrightable work falls into one of the categories listed in
Section 101(2). In the case of a written agreement, the question would be whether the agree-
ment addressed disputes over social network accounts.
378. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740-41.
379. In Nevada's Employee Inventions Statute: Novel, Nonobvious, and Patently Wrong,
Mary LaFrance argues that the requirement that a work be prepared within the scope of em-
ployment gives employees notice as to when their future copyrightable works will belong to
their employers. LaFrance, supra note 317, at 103. As a result, employees may bargain for
appropriate compensation. Id. Under this reasoning, the work-made-for-hire rule functions as a
way to ensure that an employee agrees that her employers will own the copyright to the work
because the employee can decide ahead of time if she will produce copyrightable works under
these conditions. Id.
380. See Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 419 A.2d 1115, 1117 (N.H. 1980) ("The product of
one who is hired to invent, accomplish a prescribed result, or aid in the development of prod-
ucts belongs to the employer in the absence of a written contract to assign."); see also Kinkade
v. N.Y. Shipbuilding Corp., 122 A.2d 360, 364 (N.J. 1956); Nat'l Dev. Co. v. Gray, 55 N.E.2d
783, 787 (Mass. 1944).
381. Cotter, supra note 330, at 594; 8-22 CHIsUM ON PATENTs § 22.03[2] (2012) (listing
factors for the hired-to-invent doctrine in cases of patentable inventions).
382. Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Pfeiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994); City of Newark v.
Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 7-9 (D.N.J. 1995).
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resolving the right of access to the account under the trade secret law ap-
proach. For example, where the worker is an independent contractor, the
copyright in any content she posted in a social network account would vest
in her at creation, even if she had impliedly agreed that the account itself
would belong to her employer.383 However, where the worker has agreed to
give the right of access to her employer, she would likely be considered to
have given the employer an implied license to the content to the extent nec-
essary to use the account. 384 In the worst case, however, where the court
determined that different parties owned the rights to copyrighted material as
opposed to rights to the account, the court could order that copyrighted ma-
terial be deleted from the account."' In short, copyright claims would likely
not conflict with the trade secret approach to resolving access to the account.
Inevitably, there will be some hard cases where rights conflict-for in-
stance, where one party clearly has rights to the social network account and
the other has a right to copyrighted content, which cannot be deleted. Courts
will struggle to balance the interests in these cases. Nevertheless, in most
cases, the trade secret approach will offer the best approach to allocating
rights in the account while avoiding conflict with other legal paradigms.
D. The Comparative Inferiority of a Personal Property Approach
A possible alternative to the trade secret approach is treating a social
network account as a form of personal property. The plaintiff might claim a
right of personal property in the account itself and make a claim for conver-
sion. Indeed, in the cases thus far, the plaintiffs have done just that.8 6 The
trade secret approach, however, is superior for two principal reasons. First,
the hired-to-invent doctrine in trade secret law offers a robust common law
framework to resolve the issue of allocation of rights ab initio which the law
of personal property lacks. Second, the definition of a trade secret restricts
trade secret protection to the interests at the heart of these disputes. In con-
trast, personal property does not have such strict definitional limitations. As
a result, protecting social network accounts as personal property may result
in overprotection, to the detriment of competition and the public interest.
Assuming a plaintiff can establish that she has a personal property right
in a social network account, she would be likely to succeed in a conversion
383. Unless it fell under 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2011).
384. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that an implied license is granted where the copyright owner gives the licensee material em-
bodying the work in exchange for compensation where the material would have no value
without a copyright license to the copyrighted work).
385. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. This option would not apply, of course,
where the information could not be deleted.
386. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013);
PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011).
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claim against someone who locked her out of the account. Conversion is an
intentional exercise of dominion or control over personal property which
"seriously interferes with the right of another to control it."m37 Where a de-
fendant locks the plaintiff out of the account by changing the password, the
defendant has "seriously interfered" with the right of control."' The plain-
tiff, in fact, loses all control.38 9 The harder question is whether the account
should be considered a form of personal property.
A social network account possesses some of the characteristics of prop-
erty. It is rivalrous where only one of the disputing parties may effectively
use the links in the account to communicate with others at one time. 390 The
account is also excludable in the sense that access requires a password which
can be safeguarded from others. Finally, the account resembles property in
that it satisfies Locke's justification for property rights. Under the Lockean
labor theory of property, the account holder should have a property right in
the fruits of her own labor. 9'
In some cases, courts have found that similar items qualified as property
and could be the subject of conversion. In Kremen v. Cohen, for example,
the Ninth Circuit held that, under California law, an internet domain name
was personal property for purposes of a conversion claim. 392 Similarly, in
Staton Holdings, Inc. v. First Data Corp., the Northern District of Texas
found that, under Texas law, a telephone number could be subject to conver-
sion as personal property. 393 In general, the law appears to be moving in the
direction of finding intangible items such as domain names and phone num-
bers to be personal property and subject to conversion. 394
Granting personal property rights in the account does not necessarily
conflict with the terms of use of the social network platform. Property rights
in the account might be defined quite narrowly, perhaps only as a right of
387. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oiF TORs § 222A (1965). The plaintiff might be even bet-
ter served by a claim for replevin. The elements of replevin are the same as those of conver-
sion, but, in an action for replevin, the plaintiff may recover possession of the property at
issue, whereas, in an action of conversion, the plaintiff may only recover damages. See, e.g.,
First Nat. Bank of Steeleville v. ERB Equip. Co., 972 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
1998).
388. RESTATEFMENT (SEcoNo) oF TORTS § 222A.
389. Id.
390. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (2005).
391. See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ.
L. Rrv. 371, 388 (2003).
392. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003).
393. Stanton Holdings v. First Data Corp., No. 3:04-CV-2321-P, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47190, at *15 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2005).
394. See, e.g. Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1045-46 n.5 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing cases);
Astroworks, Inc. v. Astroexhibit, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 609, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that
the plaintiff could maintain a claim for conversion of his website); Val D. Ricks, The Conver-
sion of Intangible Property: Bursting the Ancient Trover Bottle with New Wine, 1991 BYU L.
REV. 1681, 1682.
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use and exclusion subject to the rights of the social network platform
provider. 9 1
The conversion cause of action, however, stumbles in the employment
context where the challenge is to determine which party has the right to the
account at the moment of creation. It is, in a sense, previously un-owned.
Personal property law rarely tackles the question of who gains the property
right in previously unowned items. 96 Except for a few odd cases involving
things like foxes on public beaches, 3 9 7 most issues of personal property own-
ership are resolved by tracing the chain of title back one link or so to the last
instance of good title.398 Thus, in the employment context, even if the agree-
ment between the parties is unclear, disputes over items of personal property
created during the course of employment can typically be resolved by refer-
ence to the chain of title. For example, if a worker makes a shoe, the em-
ployer has a right to the shoe when the shoe was made from leather
belonging to the employer.399
The chain of title approach, however, does not resolve disputes over
rights to an account. Both the account and the links in the account are cre-
ated anew. They are previously nonexistent and unowned, subject to rights
of the social network services. 40011 Moreover, a right to possess the account
does not flow clearly from the social network platform provider to one party
or the other. Although the terms of use create a contract with the user grant-
ing a limited right to use the account, it is not necessarily clear on whose
behalf the user has contracted with the social network platform provider.4 11'
In intellectual property law, however, new intellectual property is cre-
ated all the time. As a result, a robust set of rules exists for assigning rights
in new intellectual property, especially in the employment context. This Ar-
395. Property is essentially just a catchall phrase for a bundle of rights, such as the rights
to enjoy, use, transfer, possess, and exclude. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do
Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38
CATH. U. L. Ruiv. 365, 370 (1988-1989). Property may possess only some of these rights and
even those rights may be subject to numerous limitations. See id. In practice, the terms of use
on social media websites invariably claim that the social network provider retains all rights in
the social network. See supra note 282.
396. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHi. L. Rv7v. 73, 73
(1985).
397. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
398. See Rose, supra note 396, at 74-75.
399. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (2011) ("No one would claim that an autoworker who builds a car while
working in a factory owns that car."); RAY ANDREws BRowN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PERSONAL PROPERrY 49 (1936) (discussing the law of accession); Earl C. Arnold, The Law of
Accession of Personal Property, 22 Coitum. L. Ruy. 103, 111-13 (1922) (discussing right to
recover damages for personal property made into a new product by the application of skill or
labor).
400. See supra note 282.
401. See supra note 122 (The Terms of Service for Google Plus explicitly allow users to
use its services on behalf of a company).
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ticle has described in some detail the hired-to-invent and work-made-for-hire
doctrines. 402
In the personal property context, the law of agency would likely govern
disputes about title to items created during the course of employment. Be-
cause the law of agency governs when a worker's actions affect the em-
ployer's legal position, the law of agency would also govern when the
worker's actions vest legal property rights in the employer to a new ac-
count.403 However, because the problem is so rare, there is no robust com-
mon law tradition or legislation addressing the problem of rights to newly
created personal property in the employment context. 404 As a result, courts
would have to create law which balances interests in optimizing incentives
to create, promoting worker mobility, and protecting the expectations of the
parties out of whole cloth. In contrast, trade secret law provides a ready
framework for balancing the relevant policy concerns.
Furthermore, the dangers of conferring a new property right in social
network accounts outweigh the advantages. As a general rule, property
rights should only be granted when they promote the public good. 405 In this
case, where trade secret law provides a limited and effective form of protec-
tion, it is unnecessary to create a new personal property right to resolve the
problem. 40 6
Worse, granting a personal property right may cause harm. Personal
property rights would have to be very narrowly defined to avoid overpro-
tecting the account. But properly delineating the extent of rights would be
challenging for the courts or legislatures, especially since the technology and
terminology is changing rapidly. A broadly defined personal property right
in a social network account might circumvent intellectual property limita-
tions, thereby reducing the public domain and diminishing the free flow of
information. For example, a personal property right in followers' publicly
available names linked to a social network account might decrease competi-
tion by preventing others from collecting and using this information. In addi-
tion, a proliferation of rights might create an anticommons in which the
402. See supra Parts Ill.B and I11.C.3.
403. See RESTATEMENTI (THIRD) oo AaENcy § 1.01, comment c (2006).
404. The author has tried in vain to find law dealing directly with the issue of rights to
previously unowned personal property in the employment context. Copyright law draws on the
law of agency to resolve ownership in the employment context, but the copyright approach is
the result of a legislative compromise and common law development specific to the copyright
context. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51 (1989).
405. Samuelson, supra note 395, at 392 ("Justice Holmes seemed to say that where pro-
tection can be afforded without granting a right to exclude, it is unnecessary to create property
rights to resolve the problem.").
406. See id.
A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights
transactional costs of dealing with the rights of other participants discour-
ages investment in social network platforms. 4 07
Limiting the trade secret rights to a social network account poses con-
siderably less challenge because trade secrets are already adequately limited
by their definition. 40s In contrast, the definition of personal property is broad:
"any movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and is not
classified as real property."44  Indeed, the definition of personal property is
effectively a definition by default-property that is not real property. 410
Trade secrets do not encompass information in the public domain. 411
Trade secret protection would only provide protection for exclusive access
to the account and only when the secret of access is kept secret and derives
independent economic value from its secrecy. Damages would essentially
only cover the loss of convenience resulting from lost secret access to the
account.
A trade secret approach would also limit frivolous litigation. If protec-
tion were not limited to accounts to which exclusive access conferred a com-
petitive advantage, the putative owner could sue, for example, for
harassment of a former worker who had gone to a competitor, even if the
account would provide no commercial advantage. 4 12 Trade secret law would
also require that the plaintiff take reasonable steps to keep the password
secret. 4 13 A broadly defined personal property might require no such self-
help efforts.
The personal property approach has another flaw. Because many states
do not allow claims for conversion for intangible items, the law would not
407. See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL'. L. Riy. 439, 442-44 (2003).
408. Again, trade secrets are limited to information that derives independent economic
value from being secret and that is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. See
UNIF. TRADE SEIcrrs ACr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1986).
409. BI.ACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1337 (9th ed. 2009); see also BRowN, supra note 399, at
49 (categorizing personal property as rights in moveables as opposed to rights in land).
410. See BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 1337 (9th ed. 2009).
411. See UNIP. TRADE SEcRIrrs Acr § 1(4). By definition, trade secrets are information
that derive independent economic value from not being generally known or readily ascertaina-
ble. Id.
412. See id. (requiring a trade secret to have "independent economic value"). This re-
quirement would not prevent a worker from reclaiming a purely personal account from an
employer. Even if the worker did not intend to use the account for commercial purposes, the
fact that the employer wants the account indicates it must have some commercial value at least
to the employer. See id.
413. See id. § 1.
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develop in a coherent manner.4 14 In contrast, trade secret laws, including the
hired-to-invent principle, are quite similar in every state.4 15
For all these reasons, the better approach is to resolve the disputes using
trade secrets law.
CONCLUSION
As social network accounts become ever more influential and valuable,
the allocation of rights in these accounts will have increasingly important
consequences to society. This Article examines in detail the tremendous ben-
efits which accrue to the public from online social networking. In essence,
account holders should be encouraged to provide information that members
of the public clearly value due to their decision to follow the account. At the
same time, account holders should have confidence that their investment in
attracting followers to the account will give them the rewards of access to
those followers. To protect this investment and the resulting benefits to the
public, this Article offers a simple and practical solution. Account holders do
not need a new species of personal property; traditional principles of trade
secret law provide the best framework to optimize incentives to invest in
social network accounts.
414. As a case in point, the court in Eagle v. Morgan rejected the claim for conversion
because Pennsylvania does not recognize a claim of conversion for intangibles. Eagle v. Mor-
gan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). However, the conver-
sion claim survived a motion to dismiss in PhoneDog. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474
MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). Several states do not recognize a
claim of conversion for intangibles. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Citibank, N.A., 543 F.3d 907, 910
(7th Cir. 2008) (Illinois); Struzziero v. Lifetouch Nat'l Sch. Studios, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 350,
354 (D. Mass. 2009) (Massachusetts); In re Paige, 413 B.R. 882, 916 (Bankr. D. Utah 2009)
(Utah). However, further muddying the waters, Utah law considers domain names to be tangi-
ble property. Paige, 413 B.R. at 918. Other states do recognize a claim for conversion of
intangibles. Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 805 F. Supp. 2d 213,
221 (E.D. Va. 2011) (noting that in Virginia the intangible rights are merged into a document);
Paradigm Alliance, Inc. v. Celeritas Techs., LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1189 (D. Kan. 2009)
(Kansas); In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1101
(D. Nev. 2007) (recognizing that the intangible rights are merged into a document in
Delaware).
415. See I MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 201, at § 101 [2][b] (showing a table of juris-
dictions where the Revised Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted).
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